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The issue of pension benefit security is currently in the foreground of both 
economic and political debate in many OECD countries. After a ‘golden age’ 
for pension funds, which enjoyed high investment returns and funding 
surpluses throughout the 1990s, a more troubled period has emerged since the 
start of the millennium. With equity market corrections, (and the subsequent 
questioning of long-term equity return assumptions), a low interest rate 
environment, asset liability mismatches, severe underfunding (highlighted by 
accounting changes), ageing populations, financial scandals and loss of 
pension benefits, the whole defined benefit pension system in many countries 
is under assault. Once the rise in defined contribution schemes (and the 
uncertainty they inherently entail) as well as the scaling back of government 
pensions are also taken into consideration, people of all ages are rightly asking 
what retirement income they can rely on? Though the subject has been 
debated on many occasions, recent events have ensured that the topic of 
pension benefit security has once again become a focus for policy discussion. 
Some countries have dealt with benefit protection via strong funding 
rules (the route taken for example by the Dutch authorities). This paper 
examines an alternative method of increasing benefit security in retirement – 
pension benefit protection schemes (the option current being introduced in 
the UK). The ultimate risk faced by beneficiaries of defined benefit 
occupational pension schemes, (or defined contribution type schemes where 
the pension fund itself is responsible for any return, benefit promise or 
guarantee), is the loss of their retirement income were their corporate plan 
sponsor to go bankrupt whilst the company pension plan is underfunded. 
Given rising bankruptcy levels and widespread underfunding, the likelihood 
of such an event seems to have increased in several countries. Benefit 
protection schemes, also known as insolvency guarantee schemes, cover lost 
pension income in such cases. This paper will examine the arguments for 
and against such schemes at both a theoretical and practical level. Detail 
studies of the countries where these schemes exist will then follow.  
 
II.  Arguments for Benefit Protection Schemes.  
i. Market  Failure 
The main theoretical argument in favour of benefit protection schemes is 
derived from the concept of market failure. In theoretical terms, pensions 
can be seen as deferred wages, provided by companies in return for workers 
sacrificing some current income or other form of compensation. In 
estimating how much current wages they are prepared to give up in order to 
receive a pension income in retirement, employees calculate the perceived 
security of the sponsoring firm honouring these future promises. The lower 
the sponsoring firm’s bankruptcy risk, the more wage concessions a 
company can extract for a given level of promised pension benefits. In a 
perfectly competitive market with full information workers in poorly funded 
plans with a near- bankrupt employer will grant few or no wage concessions 
as they do not believe that their pension will ever be paid. Consequently, 
compensation for bankruptcy and loss of pension should already have been 
considered through this trade off mechanism
1. Some prefer to see pensions 
are complex savings schemes sponsored by employers (providing a way of 
smoothing life-time income) rather than deferred wages. Only if the likihood 
of default is greater than the income tax benefit gained from pensions 
savings should the employee decline the pension offer. Individual biometric 
risks should also come into the calculation.  
The problem with this theory (as pointed out by Mitchell (1987), 
Ippolito (1985/ 1987) and others) is that workers do not necessarily 
understand the bargains and calculations they are making, and do not always 
have all the information necessary to make such decisions – given the 
complicating issue of asymmetric information between workers and 
employers. They consequently remain more exposed to the bankruptcy of 
the sponsoring firm than their wage bargaining implies. The recent outcry 
over the loss of pension benefits by workers of several UK firms would 
certainly suggest that this is the case
2. The justification for pension benefit 
protection schemes is that they provide an extra layer of security for 
beneficiaries against a sponsor’s bankruptcy and therefore compensate for 
any asymmetric information situation and correct for any market failure.  
Cooper and Ross (1994) describe this market failure in terms of ‘market 
fragilities’ and contracting problems. Markets are fragile when buyers may 
lose confidence that sellers will not stay in the market long enough to fulfill 
their contractual obligations. The problem arises in any buyer-seller setting 
where the current action of the buyer is taken in anticipation of a future 
action by the seller. Guarantee funds have been set up in many sectors 
(pension benefits, deposit insurance, travel packages etc.) in order to support trade in such potentially fragile markets, by acting as a substitute or backup 
in case a seller cannot commit to future market participation and cannot 
honour a contract. Pension benefit protection schemes operate by providing 
confidence to workers who may otherwise be concerned about the future 
viability of their firm and its ability to honour its pension promises. If 
workers become concerned enough, they might leave the firm or demand 
higher wages today, either of which could hurt the company and make the 
very bankruptcy event they fear a self fulfilling prophesy. As in the case of 
deposit insurance, pension guarantees can avoid this type of behavioural run. 
ii. Diversification 
A further aspect of the market failure discussed above is the issue of 
diversification. Even if it is accepted that workers do have all the 
information required to make an efficient trade-off between current wages 
and future retirement income, a market failure may still occur due to the 
problem of diversification. Workers in occupation pension schemes receive 
their current and future income from the same source, and are therefore 
highly dependent on their employer, suffering a ‘double blow’ if the 
company enters bankruptcy. Portfolio theory argues that efficient risk 
bearing requires sufficient diversification across asset classes and individual 
issuers. Yet it may be difficult for employees to diversify the risk posed by 
their current and future income coming from a single source. Most 
employees are unlikely to have assets or portfolios of sufficient size or the 
investment expertise necessary to hedge the risk of their pension assets, as 
for many workers occupational pension benefits constitute a large 
proportion of total retirement savings. Only the most highly compensated 
managerial employees may have the financial wealth and knowledge 
required to diversify away the risks of their defined benefit pension claims, 
yet even they may face restrictions (e.g. on short-selling the firm’s 
securities). Diversification is especially difficult if membership of the 
corporate pension scheme is mandatory, or for life time employees who 
work for a single firm during their careers. The problem with this situation is 
pointed out by Bodie (1996). Despite the fact that they are unable to 
diversify their pension risk, when it comes to their pension benefit workers 
often wish to have as low a risk exposure as possible to their retirement 
income. Bodie therefore argues that few employees would consciously agree 
to accept default risk on their pension benefits in order to increase their 
expected cash wages, even if they have all of the relevant information 
necessary to assess the default risk of the firm - which in most cases they do 
not which makes the welfare loss even greater.  
The problem of diversification becomes even more key when pensions 
are funded via a book reserve system. In such cases, pension benefits are not  
 
secured by an external pool of diversified assets, as pension assets form part 
of the plan sponsor’s balance sheet. As a consequence a book reserve system 
can be likened to a funded system in which all of the pension plan assets are 
invested in a single security – i.e. the debt of the sponsoring firm. If the plan 
sponsor were to go bankrupt the accrued pensions of both active and retired 
workers would clearly be at risk. In theory pension fund trustees could 
overcome this concentrated exposure, for example by shorting the 
sponsoring company’s stock. However restrictions will usually be in place 
to prevent this and, where the pension fund is particularly large compared 
with the market capitalization of the sponsoring firm, such action could have 
an extremely adverse effect on the share price. Hence benefit protection 
schemes are often compulsory for firms operating internal forms of funding 
(as is the case in Germany and Sweden).  
III.   Challenges for benefit protection schemes. 
i.  Moral Hazard  
The main theoretical argument against pension benefit protection 
schemes is moral hazard. This is a classic problem with any type of 
insurance, where the buyer of the insurance product adopts riskier models of 
behaviour as an undesirable response to the financial protection provided by 
the insurance carrier. In the case of pension benefit guarantees, if a plan 
sponsor knows that upon bankruptcy their pension fund liabilities will be 
covered, even if sufficient assets are not available to back these promise, 
they may be incentivized to indulge in irresponsible behaviour, leaving 
others to cover the costs of the pension promises they have made. Such 
behaviour may include raising benefits to unsupportable levels, cutting their 
own contribution rates, or pursuing a risky investment strategy. Moral 
hazard can be avoided to some extent, for example by not covering increases 
in benefits awarded in a period leading up to bankruptcy (as is the case with 
in PSVaG in Germany). Other measures can be put in place to reduce 
incentives to abuse the insurance system, such as limiting the pension 
benefit covered (as is the case with the Ontario fund) or by imposing strict 
funding rules to limit the size of the potential claim taken on by the 
guarantee scheme. Moral hazard can also be limited by charging higher 
premiums as the pension becomes more underfunded, or if a risky 
investment strategy is followed. However, if premiums paid to the 
protection scheme do not fully reflect the risk presented by the insured it is 
impossible to eliminate moral hazard completely. Such problems should not 
be over-stated (for example it may be logical for company in difficulty to 
effectively raise capital via underfunding the pension scheme if the market 
cost of capital were higher, as they may thereby reduce the risk of insolvency). However, problems with the PBGC in the USA shows that 
‘gaming the system’ is possible and needs to be protected against.  
ii. Adverse  Selection 
The problem of adverse selection also stems from the mispricing of 
premiums. If, when setting the premium rate, due consideration is not taken 
of the contributing firm’s bankruptcy risk, pension funding level and 
investment policy, stronger member firms will inevitably end up subsidising 
weaker ones. If these cross subsidies are too high the problem of adverse 
selection kicks in, with financially secure firms finding ways of pulling out 
of the guarantee system (e.g. by replacing their defined benefit schemes with 
defined contribution ones). Protection scheme members therefore have the 
incentive to follow others out of the system in a ‘bank run’ type fashion to 
avoid being the last solvent member shouldering the burden of the 
underfunding of all bankrupt members.  
The risk pricing of premiums does, however, seems to be very difficult to 
achieve in practice. Various studies have shown that premiums charged by 
existing pension protection schemes are not properly priced as they do not 
truly adjust premiums to take account of all sources of risk
3. Most schemes do 
adjust for underfunding levels (e.g. PBGF of Ontario or the Japanese 
guarantee fund), but do not take account  for the key risk which is the 
solvency of the corporate plan sponsor, despite corporate debt markets making 
such judgments on companies daily. The new PPF in the UK does take such 
risk into account when setting their levy, whilst the Swedish scheme does so 
via the ability to take a lien on a firm’s assets. Investment risk is not 
considered by the schemes, but has been calculated to be a more minor issue.  
The problem seems to be that fully risk adjusted premiums would be too 
expensive for many firms to bear, with proper firm specific pricing of 
premiums pushing the weakest firms into bankruptcy, thereby hurting the very 
workers the insurance system was trying to help. Another problem may be 
that to fully reserve for possible future claims and therefore to keep the 
guarantee system adequately funded would also be prohibitively expensive, 
given that claims tend to be ‘lumpy’ and several standard deviation risks 
would have to be covered
4. A further conundrum raised by properly risk 
adjusted premiums is that they could spell the final nail in the coffin for 
defined benefit schemes by making these too expensive for plan sponsors to 
operate and therefore finally persuading them to move to DC style plans 
(which once again places more risk in the hands of the beneficiaries the 
scheme was initially supposed to protect).
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iii.  Systemic Risk Issues  
One reason given as to why pension protection premiums are not priced 
correctly (and indeed cannot be as they would be prohibitively expensive) is 
that there is systemic risk involved in guaranteeing pension benefits. This 
stems from the fact that the bankruptcy and underfunding risks of plan 
members are correlated, meaning that the insured risk cannot be spread 
sufficiently. The basic principle underlying any insurance system is the 
sharing of non-systemic risk. Insurance works when the incidence and 
severity of events covered by the insurance scheme are relatively 
independent across the insured population. Pension benefits can be insured 
for non-systemic events (such as poor corporate management, fraud etc.). 
They cannot, however, provide cover for  systemic ones, such as 
macroeconomic weakness, which increases the bankruptcy risk of all 
companies (though not necessarily equally), or sharp equity market and 
interest rate declines (which are systemic problems given the similar liability 
structure of occupational pension plans and their tendency to follow the 
same asset allocation patterns). To make matters worse, bankruptcy risk is 
highly correlated with underfunding, as plan sponsors tend to stop making 
contributions to their pension funds when they get into financial difficulty. 
In addition, protection schemes which actually take over the assets of failed 
pension plans (such as the PBGC in the US and the PPF in the UK) may 
face an extra layer of correlation if they invest the assets which they have 
taken over in the same manner as the pension funds which they are 
guaranteeing. If their investment returns turn negative at the same time as 
their clients, their own financial position worsens. As pension funds become 
a larger part of the corporate capital structure it is possible that this systemic 
risk will increase even further (and it is not implausible to envisage that in 
future an insolvent pension fund could even cause the bankruptcy of a 
company). It may be possible to insure against systemic risk across time, but 
this would involve building large reserves, which, as discussed, may make 
these guarantee schemes unaffordable.  
Some argue that systemic risk may be the reason why private sector 
pension benefit guarantee insurance is impossible, but actually explains why 
government sponsored schemes are necessary. Pesando (1996) argues that 
due to systemic risk private markets may not be able to provide plan 
termination insurance even if demanded or that this insurance could exist 
only at premium rates that are commensurate with these risks. The 
subsequent argument is that governments must therefore step in to provide 
beneficiaries with the necessary coverage. However, given developments in 
financial markets, financial (risk hedging) products and the increasing 
sophistication of private sector investment banks, it is really possible to 
argue that the private sector is still not capable of providing coverage for pension benefits?
6 With firms, for example in the UK, beginning to offer 
such insurance, a new risk may be posed to the protection schemes if the 
best risks are taken by the private sector, leaving them with lower quality 
firms to cover with less premium income. However, the major difficulty 
with government backed schemes is persuading tax payers to accept the 
burden of pension insurance costs. In practice this means tax payers, (who 
are, it should be noted, in many countries seeing their state pensions being 
reduced), subsidizing or indeed bailing out those lucky enough to still be in 
corporate defined benefit schemes, and who tend to be relatively well paid – 
a situation which may not be tenable. The fiscal burden of such protection 
schemes can be lessened to some extent, for example by imposing strict 
funding rules or asset matching requirements (which prevent pension 
schemes from becoming severe underfunded), or by placing a ceiling on 
benefits covered (as is the case with the scheme in Ontario, which provides 
protection only up to CAD$12,000). Yet governments are inevitably 
expected to be the final protectors of retirement income in times of systemic 
stress and, particularly if these schemes are mandatory or incentivized, 
surely it is difficult for the government not to act as a lender of last resorts 
should systemic problems arise?   
IV.   Practical Issues 
i. Political  vs.  Economic 
Following on from the observations on possible governmental 
involvement in these schemes, it should be noted that pension benefit 
protection schemes have generally been set up in reaction to political events. 
Maybe the justification for the existence of such schemes can really be 
found in the realm of politics rather than economic efficiency, as they often 
have implicit, if not explicit, cross-subsidy and transfer objectives? For 
example, it has been argued that the PBGC was set up during in the USA 
during the 1970’s to support mature industrial sectors of the economy.
7 
Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that the only Canadian province to offer 
pension insurance is Ontario, which is often seen as the industrial heartland 
of the country, and that this guarantee fund was set up in 1980 following a 
series of threatened plant shutdowns. The decision to introduce a protection 
scheme in the UK follows intense political pressure to cover pension losses 
for over 65,000 members of company schemes who have seen their plan 
sponsors become bankrupt in recent years. Yet it has been forcefully argued 
that whatever the merits of industry support subsidies, there are good 
reasons not to use cheap pension guarantees as the way to subsidize firms as 




If these schemes were set up for political reasons in the past, could a 
similar argument be made to justify their continued existence today? Are the 
increased bankruptcy levels experienced in several countries in the last few 
years simply cyclical, a legacy of the ‘dot com’ bubble and the last vestiges 
of industrial decline? Or do they represent a structural change, as a more 
aggressive, competitive form of capitalism takes hold, particularly in 
countries such as Japan and Germany which previously ran ‘corporatist 
capitalism’ models where few firms failed?
 Has pension underfunding also 
become more of a structural rather than a cyclical issue, given the lower 
return but higher volatility environment of the capital markets, combined 
with pressure from increasingly demanding and public accounting 
requirements? If the latter is the case, could there be an argument that 
pension benefit guarantee schemes will be more necessary in future?  
ii.   Alternatives 
Pension benefit protection schemes cannot be discussed entirely in 
isolation, given they should act as the last barrier in the protection of 
retirement income, in place in case all other measures fail. Indeed it could be 
argued that they are unnecessary if the rest of the system is properly 
structured. For example, if the academic theories discussed at the start of 
this paper hold true, market failures could be overcome by providing 
workers with proper information and education in order to make their wage/ 
pension trade off effectively (though it should be stressed that in reality this 
is highly unlikely). Alternatively, asset allocation rules could be applied so 
that pension liabilities are fully immunized and matched with appropriate 
assets. Likewise, pension claims could be given high bankruptcy priority or 
secured creditor rights, so that liabilities would be covered by the firm’s 
assets, ahead of other creditors, in the case of bankruptcy of the plan sponsor 
(see Stewart (2007)). 
One alternative way of guaranteeing pension benefits is to impose strict 
funding rules, ensuring that pensions are never underfunded - the solution 
which has been adopted by the Dutch authorities
9. Pensando (2000) and 
others have, however, stressed that it is impossible to ensure that pension 
funds are always 100% funded, for example when investment returns 
deteriorate sharply, when actuarial assumptions prove incorrect, or when 
instruments required for full ‘immunization’ are not available. Full funding 
is additionally challenged by the fact that corporate plan sponsors tend to 
stop making pension contributions as their financial situation become more 
difficult. Funding rules may also conflict with other policy objectives (such 
as surplus funding being taxed). Pension benefit protection schemes may, 
therefore, have a role to play, even when stringent funding regulations are in 
place.  What can, however, be stressed is that a pension protection fund works 
more effectively when combined with adequate funding rules. Overly lax 
(and loosely applied) funding regulation has been cited as one of the main 
causes of the financial difficulties of the PBGC in the USA (see country 
discussion). Likewise in the UK, despite minimum funding rules proving 
inadequate in the past, concerns are being raised over whether new scheme 
specific funding rules will provide sufficient protection for the new PPF 
scheme. Without adequate funding rules claims on pension protection 
schemes have effectively no upside limit, potentially making premiums 
extremely (if not prohibitively) expensive. Strict funding and investment 
rules should be seen as compliments to any pension protection scheme. For 
example, if funding rules and protection schemes are designed to work 
together the problem of ‘systematic underfunding’ (where a company 
deliberately cuts back on pension contributions as it gets into financial 
difficulty) can be tackled.
10 Insolvency schemes can also be combined with 
other pension protection measures, such as asset allocation controls or 
priority bankruptcy rights, to ensure that there is some upside protection to 
the level of claims.
11 This prevents all the responsibility for pension benefit 
protection falling onto the guarantee scheme, a responsibility which may 
prove prohibitively expensive, making the scheme unworkable.  
iii. Other guarantee schemes 
Perhaps practical arguments in favour of pension guarantee schemes can 
be found through looking at equivalent schemes which have been 
successfully operated in other sectors – notably insurance?
12 Policyholder 
protection funds or guarantee schemes within the insurance sector are fairly 
common across OECD countries, usually for a specific class of insurance 
(compulsory motor insurance being the most common), but also in some 
countries for more general insurance contracts. The arguments put forward 
for these schemes are largely the same as those for pension protection funds, 
including overcoming an asymmetry of information and injecting 
confidence into the system to prevent bank deposit style runs. The 
drawbacks are also very similar, focusing on moral hazard, cross subsidy 
and structural correlation problems. As with pension guarantees, insurance 
guarantee systems were often introduced in reaction to political pressure 
following insurance company failures and their necessity is seen as differing 
according to the specific situation in countries (e.g. those countries placing 
insurance policy holders high in the bankruptcy creditor list are seen as 
having less need for an additional insurance system). Government 
guarantees stand explicitly or implicitly behind most schemes.  Yet despite 
these insurance guarantee schemes received resounding support from the 
European Commission in a recent Working Paper,
13 the Commission is not  
 
recommending such guarantee funds be introduced for pension benefits 
(perhaps because most European countries either operate DC pension funds, 
or apply strict funding and asset allocation rules so that protection schemes 
would only be required in a few countries).  
V. Conclusion 
Pension benefit protection schemes do not come without their difficulties 
and the debate surrounding their role is on-going, especially within the 
framework of strengthening funding and investment regulation. One case 
where a definitive argument can, however, be made in their favour is when 
pensions are funded using a book reserve system. In this case, the lack of 
diversification seems to be an overriding issue and some form of benefit 
guarantee system is therefore required. Indeed, the OECD’s ‘Guidelines on 
funding and benefit security’ highlight just such a situation:
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1.3 Occupational defined benefit plans should in general be funded 
through the establishment of a pension fund or through an insurance 
arrangement (or a combination of these mechanisms). Additional protection 
may be provided through the granting of priority creditor rights to plan 
members and beneficiaries and through insolvency guaranty schemes that 
protect pension benefits in the case of insolvency of the plan sponsor.  
1.4 Private unfunded plans should generally be prohibited. The 
establishment of an insolvency guaranty scheme should in general be 
required for occupational defined benefit plans that are financed through 
the book reserve system. 
1.5 Insolvency guaranty schemes should rely on appropriate pricing of 
the insurance provided in order to avoid unwarranted incentives for risk-
taking (moral hazard). 
For autonomous pension funds, the need for a pension benefit protection 
scheme is less clear cut. Their inherent difficulties (moral hazard, cross 
subsidies, systemic correlations) imply that other (less political) means for 
protecting pension benefits should be introduced first. Good funding rules 
can achieve almost all of what a guarantee scheme is striving for, are 
arguably easier to design and manage and, especially when combined with 
other measures, (such as asset liability matching or priority bankruptcy 
rights), offer a high level of protection. If a protection scheme is 
successfully combined with funding rules or other protection measures it can 
effectively perform its task as a ‘last resort’ measure. Whilst the goal of 
protection schemes is mainly to manage the consequences of pension fund 
bankruptcy, efforts to prevent such bankruptcies and underfunding should be 
prioritized. Indeed the guarantee schemes themselves call for adequate funding and investment regulations, which reduce the risks they face and 
enable them to intervene less. 
A further conclusion which can be drawn is that if protection schemes 
are to be introduced they must be carefully designed in order to avoid their 
inherent weaknesses. The failure of the pension guarantee fund in Finland in 
the early 1990’s,
15 or indeed the Savings and Loan fiasco in the USA in the 
1980s, (see US country section), show how important it is to design any 
insurance system carefully. Given around 75 million people worldwide are 
protected by these schemes, their successful functioning is certainly 
important for the social welfare and economy of the countries in which they 
operate. Positive aspects can be identified in all of the protection schemes 
currently in operation. For example, the PBGC in the US phases in 
improvements made to benefits, limits the amount of benefit covered and 
can impose involuntary terminations on corporations in a difficult financial 
situation, in order to prevent the size of the potential claim against the 
guarantee fund escalating out of control. The scheme operating in Ontario 
corrects for some of the mistakes made on the introduction of the PBGC in 
the USA, including prohibiting the voluntary termination of underfunded 
plans (thereby limiting moral hazard and the exercise of the 'pension put' 
against the guarantee fund by employers that could continue supporting their 
pension fund) and holding a lien on the assets of the plan sponsor. 
Meanwhile, benefit improvements granted in the two years before 
bankruptcy are not covered by the German PSVaG. The great strength of the 
Swedish insurance system is its strong collateral backing, whilst the Swiss 
scheme (like those in Germany and Sweden) buys out annuities, rather than 
taking on the assets of pension plans. The Pension Guarantee fund in Japan 
can refuse a claim if funding levels are too low.  
Drawing on these practical experiences, both good and bad, the 
following principles for the successful operation of a pension benefit 
guarantee system can be identified:
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•  Limited benefit coverage: in order to limit moral hazard, certain 
benefits should be excluded from coverage (including 
improvements granted prior to insolvency). A ceiling on benefit 
coverage also seems reasonable, to make payments more 
acceptable if tax payer’s money is involved and to keep the system 
affordable (though the risk of forcing pension fund members to 
‘pay’ for the actions of fund managers, trustees or the plan sponsor 
needs to be considered). 
•  Risk based pricing: the key to any insurance scheme’s success 
(avoiding moral hazard and adverse selection) is the proper risk 
pricing of premiums, based on the expected claim levels for the  
 
insured. In the case of pensions, premiums should most importantly 
reflect the likelihood of the plan sponsor becoming insolvent (could 
be via proxy measures such as credit rating, swap levels etc.), the 
likely size of the claim, the extent of the pension plan’s 
underfunding, and potentially the risk inherent in any asset liability 
mismatch. Market based pricing is essential. Over the long term the 
aggregate level of premiums (+ investment returns) should reflect 
aggregate claim levels (and maybe a surplus should also be built), 
with flexibility needed to adjust premium levels as reality veers 
from estimates.  
•  Accurate and consistent funding rules: pension benefits should as 
far as possible be fully funded, and plan sponsors should be 
required to act swiftly in order to limit losses. Successfully 
combining a guarantee scheme with funding rules ensures some 
upside limit to potential claims and makes the guarantee scheme 
affordable. In order to ensure stable funding, consistent and 
adequate financial measurement and disclosure are required.  
•  Prudent asset liability management: pension funds should be 
encouraged to follow prudent asset allocation strategies, which 
avoid large swings in funding levels, again limiting potential claims 
and making the guarantee scheme more affordable. Likewise the 
guarantee fund itself, if it takes over the assets of insolvent pension 
schemes, should follow an appropriate investment strategy, and one 
which avoids correlations between its own financial position and 
the funding level of the pension funds it is insuring. In order to 
avoid such correlations, guarantee funds may use annuities to buy 
out pension liabilities taken over. 
•  Adequate powers: a pension guarantee scheme needs to have 
adequate powers to avoid moral hazard, and prevent plan sponsors 
using their guarantee as a ‘put’ for their pension liabilities. For 
example, extra premiums or collateral must be requested (and paid) 
as the risk of insolvency at the plan sponsor rises. This again 
requires transparent and timely disclosure of information by the 
plan sponsor.  Proper powers to claim assets via the bankruptcy 
process may also help the funding and functioning of the guarantee 
scheme. Finally, and most importantly, any guarantee scheme 
needs to operate without undue political influence (including 
having the power to set a risk-based levy, to smooth over time and 
to take a long-term view).  
  In summary, pension benefit guarantee schemes should be run in a 
truly economically efficient manner, with properly market priced premiums. However, it is important to remember that these schemes 
support voluntary arrangements and the structure of the guarantee 
scheme needs to be mindful of this, with over protection and expensive 
premiums avoided or the pension plans may be closed down altogether. 
If a scheme proves prohibitively expensive, the cost of guaranteeing 
pension benefits can be reduced by combining with other benefit 
protection measures. However, for the guarantee scheme to work 
effectively, subsidies should not be provided, either implicitly or 
explicitly, by governments. As pension systems increasingly move from 
public to private provisioning, a major challenge for protection schemes 
is to stop public guarantees creeping back in. 
 
VI.  Country Studies  
The case studies discussed below consist only of countries which offer 
explicit insolvency insurance for defined benefit pension plans, triggered 
when the sponsoring firm becomes bankrupt and the assets do not meet the 
accrued benefits of the pension plan. Implicit guarantees also exist in some 
countries, but will not be discussed here (e.g. 20 year minimum benefit in 
Chile). Elsewhere compensation funds exist, providing cover in the case of 
fraud and illegal activities for pension income (and sometimes other benefits, 
e.g. mutual funds), but these are also not discussed.  
Although all the schemes in existence have a common objective – to 
protect benefits for members in private pension funds – each is the product 
of local circumstances which gave rise to the need to establish a protection 
regime. Similarities and differences exist between all the schemes in 
operation, but they demonstrate the multiple balancing acts – between 
politics and economics, security and costs – which must be performed and 




History: A series of corporate failures (such as the Studebaker auto 
company in the 1960s) provoked the ERISA pension legislation which was 
eventually adopted in 1974. This included a guarantee program, known as 
the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC).  
 
Coverage: The PBGC administers separate programs for single and 
multiple employer defined benefit pension plans. As of 2006, almost 44 
million individuals were covered  by the PBGC, the single employer 
insurance covering 34.2 m workers in 28,800 pension plans and the multi 
employer program 9.9m workers in 1600 plans. A total of 1.3 million people 
are currently receiving or owed benefits from the PBGC, whose annual 
benefit payments now total $3.686 billion.
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Operations: The PBGC is liable for the payment of guaranteed benefits 
with respect only to underfunded, terminated plans. Distress terminations 
occur when a company voluntarily terminates its pension plan (having filed 
for bankruptcy, or if the pension costs are proving unreasonably burdensome 
due to a decline in the number of employees covered).  Involuntary 
terminations occur when the PBGC terminates a pension plan due to a lack 
of funding, or if the loss to the PBGC is expected to increase unreasonably if 
the plan is not wound up.  In the event of the insolvency of a member 
corporation, the PBGC becomes the trustee of the plan assets and 
administers the payment of future plan benefits up to a specified maximum 
annual pension (c$47,659  per year  for a 65 year old in 2006, with 
adjustments for other ages). Some other benefits (unvested, early retirement) 
are not protected. Guaranteed benefits that are created by plan amendments 
less than 5 years old are phased in at a rate of 20% a year. In the case of 
multi-employer schemes, the PBGC steps in when a covered plan no longer 
has assets available to make benefit payments (not when the sponsor is 
bankrupt). Assistance is usually provided in the form of loans, though 
companies often cannot fully repay them. The maximum guarantee under 
the multi-employer scheme is $12,870 per year. The PBGC has dealt with 
3,595 terminated plans during its history, 120 new claims being made as of 
September 2005.  
Premiums: The scheme has three main sources of income: premiums, 
trustee assets, and investment income. Premiums are charged on flat rate 
basis (raised from $19 to $30 per plan participant as of 2006) and there is 
also a variable component ($9 per $1000 of underfunded vested benefits). 
Premiums for the multi-employer plan are charged at $2.60 per head. 
Premium income from single employer plans in 2006 amounted to $1.44bn 
(flat rate premiums $883m, variable rate $550m). Although the PBGC is not 
funded from general tax revenues, it is a government agency, and as a 
consequence is a contingent liability of the U.S. government and tax payers. 
Changes to the premium structure require legislation from Congress and 
have historically been updated several times - including in 1991 when the 
cap on insurance premiums paid by underfunded plans was removed. The 
Pensions Act passed by the Bush Administration in 2006 involves changes 
designed to strengthen retirement security. As well as reforming funding rules (e.g. introducing funding targets related to the financial strength of the 
plan sponsor, restricting benefit improvements at underfunded plans), which 
indirectly help the protection scheme, the bill also reforms the PBGC’s   
premium structure. The flat rate premium has been raised from $19 to $30 
and index linked, whilst the risk-based premium will be based on the level 
of underfunding, adjusted regularly and will be payable by all underfunded 
plans
18. 
Investment: Policy requires all premium income be invested in fixed 
income assets (in what are known as Revolving Funds), whilst assets taken 
over from terminated plans may be invested in equities (via Trust Funds) – 
which may seem contradictory, given that terminated liabilities are known, 
and therefore would seem to be better matched with bonds, whilst equity 
investment would appear to be more appropriate for premium income, 
which is designed to cover future claims. The PBGC uses external portfolio 
managers to invest these funds, with their oversight. The overall asset 
allocation of the organization is set by the Board of Directors (which 
includes the Secretaries of Labor, the Treasury and Commerce) and in 2006 
consisted of 77% bonds (the majority of liabilities are matched on a 
$ duration basis), and 23% equities. Revolving fund assets were $15.2bn 
whilst Trust Fund assets were $44bn. $2.2bn investment income was 
generated in 2006. 
ii. Issues:   
The PBGC has had a troubled financial history ever since its foundation. After 
enjoying several years of surplus during the late 1990’s (hitting $9.7bn in 2000), the 
scheme is now facing a huge and extremely troublesome deficit (see figure 1). The 2006 
annual report of the organization, (for the fiscal year ending September 2006), declared 
assets worth $61.2bn, and liabilities at $80bn, creating an $18.8bn shortfall. The 
organization was hit hard by the market and consequent economic correction from 2000 
onward. Over and above the $18.8bn shortfall, the PBGC estimates that it has a further 
$73bn possible exposure to companies which are likely to become insolvent in the near 
term (e.g. having extremely low credit ratings). The multiemployer plan may also 
require further assistance. The latest estimates from the organization for the total 
underfunding of US pension funds which it insures exceeds $450bn
19. The PBGC’s 
rapid swing from surplus to deficit is causing concern amongst plan sponsors, 
lawmakers and the tax-paying public, and its very survival is in question, raising the 
possibility of a required bail out through government funds
20. Indeed the US General 
Accounting Office has characterised the scheme as ‘high risk’.
21 There has been much 
debate over how such a huge deficit within the scheme came about. Some of the main 
causes are outlined below.  
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Another element of the PBGC’s structural funding challenge comes from the 
number of retirees and terminated vested participants in insured defined benefit plans 
now surpassing the number of active members. Consequently, how will plans ever make 
up their underfunding?  
Figure 2 
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Actives Retirees & Terminated Vesteds
 
Source: PBGC Concentrated exposure: the PBGC’s risk pool is concentrated in industries 
affected by global competition and the movement from an industrial to a 
knowledge based economy. In 2001 almost half the insured participants 
were in plans sponsored by firms in manufacturing industries (steel, autos 
etc.), many of which are heavily unionized and run flat rate schemes. These 
have always placed the PBGC particularly at risk as they promise to pay a 
nominal amount, with contracts being regularly renegotiated retroactively, 
and often substantially, to offset inflation and provide benefit improvements. 
As increases in pension promises cannot be funded in advance (due to tax 
limitations) automatic, and often large, underfunding situations are created 
at these schemes, which entail similarly large potential exposure for the 
PBGC. Although the PBGC’s "problem" will eventually go away (as flat 
benefit plans are generally legacy costs of shrinking heavy industries, and 
many others shift to DC schemes) the funding situation of the organization 
may get worse before it gets better. The PBGC remains highly exposed to 
the steel and particularly airline industries, from which it has recently 
suffered large claims (see Figure 3 + 4).
22  
Figure 3  
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Source: PBGC 
Asset liability mismatch: a further cause of the extreme deficits at the PBGC is the 
asset allocation mix widely adopted by pension funds in recent years, and indeed by 
the PBGC itself. It can be argued that a typical US pension plan has long duration 
bond-like liabilities, but asset allocation has typically been as high as 70% in 
equities, with the fixed income portion in bonds with far shorter durations. What has 
consequently been described as a severe asset liability mismatch left pension plans, 
and therefore the PBGC, particularly exposed to the low interest rate, poor equity 
return environment which occurred from 2000 onwards. The PBGC’s own 
sensitivity to interest rates have been claimed to be a large part of its deficit (around 
one third of the move from c$10bn surplus to over $10bn deficit in 2001 was said to 
be due to interest rate sensitivity and duration mismatching). The PBGC could offset 
some of its exposure to poor equity market and macro conditions with a counter 
cyclical investment policy. Yet it still raised equity weightings itself during the 
1990’s (though the scheme announced a reversal to this approach during 2004)
23. 
Weak funding rules: weak funding rules, allowing pension plan underfunding to 
reach extreme levels, are a further cause of the PBGC’s large deficit. US funding rules employ extensive smoothing and deferral mechanisms which can insulate 
companies from having to fund emerging deficits and past service liabilities in a 
timely fashion, meaning that when accelerated contributions are finally required 
companies are often not in a position to make them
24. Steven Kandarian, former 
Executive Director PBGC, has identified poor funding rules as one of the main 
causes of his organization’s problems, and has pointed out several key weaknesses 
in these rules. These include the systematic understating of liabilities, partly as 
estimated current liabilities rarely bear any relation to the true amount of money a 
pension fund needs to meet its obligations (as these calculations do not consider 
lump sums, price annuities properly, factor in early retirement etc.), and partly as 
only highly probable, near term distress terminations (i.e. companies close to 
bankruptcy) are recognized as contingent liabilities. He also criticizes contribution 
holidays and maximum funding rules (with tax disincentives to building up a 
surplus)
25. The PBGC’s own proposals for addressing its current problems focus on 
improving funding requirements, and government suggestions for stricter 
regulations are also currently being discussed. Yet the challenges of running these 
schemes in practice is also clear from the US experience, and, as noted earlier, in all 
countries in which pension plans are voluntary. If the protection requirements are 
too onerous, there is a danger that employers will stop sponsoring plans altogether, 
leaving workers less well covered and less protected in retirement. The new rules in 
the US, passed by the Pensions Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), demonstrate this 
challenge. Though offering better protection for the PBGC, there are fears that they 
may be a catalyst for better funded schemes to freeze or to annuitize and close down. 
The new PPA charges to employers who terminate an underfunded plan in 
bankruptcy ($3750 per member) have been challenged which shows the difficultly 
of interacting with bankruptcy law.  
Figure 5: PBGC Claims by Funded Ratio 1975-2005 
 
Source: PBGC Pension Insurance Database 2005  
 
Political interference: One of the main challenges for the PBGC has been operating 
in an environment which offers numerous opportunities for political involvement 
(e.g. the pensions law, ERISA, is overseen by many bodies – Department of Labor, 
Treasury etc. -; levies are set by Congress; the PBGC Director is a political 
appointee; other cabinet Departments become involved when there is a major 
bankruptcy in their sector – e.g. the Department of Transport with an airline case). 
Interference from Congress has made, and continues to make, the underfunding 
situation even worse. Under intense lobbying pressure, politicians have intervened to 
assist companies in financial difficulty by providing temporary relief, which 
effectively make the already weak funding rules virtually meaningless. In April 
2004 temporary legislation was passed which reduced the required contributions 
sponsors must pay to their defined benefit plans by an estimated $80bn by changing 
the discount rate used to calculate liabilities. Congress also provided an additional 
$1.6bn relief to the steel and airline industries - sectors with some of the most 
underfunded pension plans and which represent the greatest exposure for the PBGC, 
both historically and potentially. These moves by Congress directly counter the 
PBGC’s own plans for strengthening the funding environment, and, though 
temporarily helping troubled industries, the measures will likely worsen the 
agency’s financial condition
26. Political interference also comes at the level of 
specific bankruptcy workouts, as priority rankings and compensation levels are 
subject to negotiations.
27 The PBGC’s problem is not that is does not have sufficient 
powers to protect itself. Such powers range from demanding larger premiums as 
underfunding rises, to potential bankruptcy priority claims, to involuntary 
termination. The organization also operates an ‘early warning system’, working with 
companies which it sees as entering into difficulties to try and ensure continued 
solvency. The issue is more that political interference stops the PBGC exercising the 
powers which it has. The fact that any changes to the PBGC premium or operational 
structure must receive Congressional approval also seems to hamper the PBGC’s 
ability to react in a correct, long-term and timely fashion to its problems. Comments 
made by Dr. Alicia Mundell as far back a1982 (quoted in Smalhout (1996)) sum up 
this position: 
“The PBGC’s vulnerability stems from its inability to control the 
action of the plan sponsors. Often it does not have access to detailed 
information about a pension plan until the company decides to 
terminate. Hence, the PBGC will always remain financially 
vulnerable and the federal government may well end up as the 
insurer of the nation’s private pension system.” 
However, despite the political involvement, the fiscal relationship between the PBGC 
and the federal government is not clear. If forced to annuitize all of its liabilities tomorrow, the PBGC would be insolvent. Indeed, decades down the line the PBGC 
could run out of funds, but it is not clear who will be left to cover the ultimate liability – 
an issue which has also not been addressed in regards to the PPF in the UK.  
Mispriced premiums: continuing on the theme of political interference, the PBGC’s 
premiums are set by Congress, and have consequently been criticized as being set at 
politically judicious rather than economically viable levels. Premiums are not market 
priced, and do not take into consideration all the risks to which the PBGC is exposed 
(e.g. there is no adjustment for the potential insolvency of the plan sponsor). Over the 
long term, the premium income of a guarantee scheme should equal its benefit 
obligations and operating expenses. However, whilst the PBGC’s benefit payments have 
increased through more plan terminations and its liabilities even more dramatically 
(partly due to interest rate and inflation exposure), its premiums have not, which has 
inevitably led to a deficit position. On top of the mispricing issue, which means that 
premiums are too low, Ippolito (2004) also points out that even these premiums are not 
fully collected, which makes the PBGC’s position even more troublesome. The 
organization is supposed to collect a variable rate premium equal to $9 for each $1000 of 
underfunding. Given the organization’s $400bn underfunding estimate in 2002, 
premiums of $3.6bn should have been collected. In reality, $787m were received, 
$586m coming from the fixed assessment of $19 per member. The PBGC therefore 
collected only $200m, or 50cents per $1000 of underfunding, around 5.5% of the 
prescribed $9 charge
28. The changes introduced in the Pensions Act of 2006 do attempt 
to address these issues. Such structural challenges partly stem from a lack of clarity over 
the PBGC’s mission – an issue which other protection schemes also face. Is the PBGC 
an insurance company? If so, it is hampered from operating on a truly commercial basis 
the levy restrictions applied by Congress (though the flat rate levy was recently 
increased to $30, as noted, it would require a flat rate premium of $80-90 for the scheme 
to become commercially viable over the next 10 years). Is the PBGC designed as an 
instrument of social policy, supporting certain workers and jobs (and if so why are 
pensions protected but not health packages)?  
 
2. Canada   
i. Description   
History: of the 10 jurisdictions that regulate private pensions in Canada 
only the province of Ontario operates a scheme guaranteeing pension 
benefits, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Fund (PBGF). This was introduced 
in 1980, around the time when plant closures at heavy industrial companies 
were being discussed in this the centre of Canadian industry. As this 
guarantee system started six years after the PBGC was introduced, some of  
 
the perceived mistakes of this operation were ironed out (including that the 
event covered being the insolvency of the plan sponsor, that a lien on 
employer assets equal to the full amount of the insured shortfall of pension 
assets was set up, voluntary terminations by underfunded plans were not 
allowed and no provision for funding waivers for employers experiencing 
financial difficulties is available).  
Coverage: the Ontario fund protects the basic pension benefits of over 1 
million beneficiaries. As in the US, the scheme in Ontario covers many flat 
rate pension plans in heavily unionized, industrial sectors.  
Operations: when a company with an underfunded pension plan covered 
by the PBGF fails a plan administrator is appointed and makes a ‘PBGF 
declaration’, valuing the guarantee promised by the organization. The PBGF 
then makes an allocation to the pension fund, and this cash is used by the 
fund to cover its liabilities (e.g. by buying annuities). Benefits are 
guaranteed up to a maximum of CAD$12,000 per year, far lower than the 
US, PBGC scheme coverage. This amount is not inflation linked and has not 
been altered since the guarantee scheme was introduced. Neither liabilities 
of a plan less than three years old are not covered, nor any benefit 
improvements made within three years of termination. Multi-employer 
schemes are also excluded.  
Premiums: initially premiums were set at 0.2% of any unfunded liability, 
but soon an annual charge of C$1 per member was added.  Following a huge 
claim in the early 1990s from Massey-Combines (the farm equipment 
producer) which caused the fund to borrow from the provincial government, 
(the subsequent interest costs absorbing all premium income), a new 
premium structure was introduced with a sliding scale for the risk adjusted 
component. For plans unfunded on a termination basis the risk adjusted 
charge increased to 0.5% of those unfunded liabilities representing up to 
10% of total liabilities. For additional unfunded liabilities representing up to 
20% of total liabilities the annual charge rose to 1% and for unfunded 
liabilities above that the charge is 1.5%.  The PBGF is currently in deficit 
again (largely due to a large claim made in 2001 on the reorganization of the 
Algoma Steel company). The financial statements for the organization
29 
from the end of March 2005 show assets of CAD$291m and liabilities of 
CAD$529m, giving a deficit of CAD$238m. In addition, in 2004 accounts 
the PBGF notified of three companies in bankruptcy proceedings - i.e. 
operating under a stay under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act - 
whose pension plans could represent very significant claims on the fund 
(one estimated at CAD$50m, another at CAD$65.4m). The 2005 accounts 
note that the PBGF is still closely involved in the bankruptcy and insolvency 
proceedings of 2 funds. The financial statements also show that the Province 
of Ontario has made an interest free loan of CAD$330m to the organization to assist with its current financial difficulties (payable at CAD$33m a year 
over 11 years), and it is expected that premium charges will also have to be 
increased.  
Investment: As of March 2005, the PBGF’s CAD$223m investments 
were held in short term deposits (35%), government and corporate bonds 
(65%). 
ii. Issues 
  Currently, the only jurisdiction in Canada to implement a pension 
benefit guarantee fund has been Ontario.  While the federal government has 
indicated that it is open to considering ways to strengthen existing 
protections in federal pension legislation, pension experts have indicated 
that a federal pension guarantee fund is not a practical option, particularly as 
federally registered DB plans account for only 5% of all pension plans in 
Canada (420 federal DB and combination plans as of March 2004, versus 
over 3000 plans registered in Ontario). In addition, a few of the federally 
registered pension plans are relatively quite large, with 10 accounting for 
roughly 70 per cent of the assets of all federally registered DB plans.   
Consequently, the ability of pension plans in a fund to distribute risk of loss 
is seen as difficult, particularly should a large plan terminate with a 
significant deficit.      
3. UK 
i.   Description   
History: under the UK’s existing pension system, implicit insurance for 
pensions was offered for the contracted out portion of the earnings related 
portion of the state pension (SERPS). These commitments were absorbed 
back into the public system if a sponsoring company went bankrupt. A 
compensation scheme to cover pension beneficiaries who lost out due to 
fraud at the sponsoring company was also introduced during the 1980s 
(following the scandal at the Maxwell pension fund)
 30. The UK has 
introduced an explicit pension benefit compensation scheme, the Pension 
Protection Fund (PPF), which began operating from 6
th April 2005. This 
Fund has been introduced on account of intense political pressure, following 
over 65,000 workers in various companies losing large amounts of their 
pension benefits in recent years on the bankruptcy of their sponsoring 
companies (including  ASW the UK’s second largest steel manufacturer). 
This pressure came in the wake of other pensions scandals in the UK (such 
as Equitable Life, and misselling issues) and, as well as providing GBP 
400m compensation for workers who had already lost out, the government  
 
felt it necessary to put a new compensation structure and new funding rules 
in place
31 in order to try and restore faith in the defined benefit pension 
system in general. Lawrence Churchill, formerly head of UK insurance at 
Zurich Financial Services, is the new organisation’s first Chairperson. 
Coverage: the PPF operates to provide compensation to members of 
eligible defined benefit occupational schemes with around 10 to 15 million 
pension fund members being covered.  
Operations: the PPF will meet payments from a central fund. The 
scheme will pay 100% level of compensation to those above the normal 
pension age and to those of any age who are already in receipt of an ill 
health or survivors pension at the start of PPF involvement with a scheme 
(subject to the removal of any rule changes in the past 3 years the aggregate 
effect of which was to increase the scheme’s overall liabilities).   
Furthermore, subsequent increases will be paid in accordance with PPF rules 
(as opposed to the scheme’s which could result in increases which are less 
than the scheme may have provided). A 90% level of compensation will be 
paid to those below retirement age subject to inflation adjustments
32 and an 
annual cap set at £29,928.56 in 2006/7 for an individual retiring at 65. Again 
this is all subject to a review of the rules of the scheme and subsequent 
increases will be paid in accordance with PPF rules.  Indexation will only be 
paid on rights accrued after 6
th April 1997 in line with Retail Price Index 
(capped at 2.5%). The PPF will also pay survivors’ benefits for eligible 
spouses, civil partners and unmarried partners at half the rate of members’ 
periodic compensation. The costs of the PPF will depend on claims that it 
experiences in future.  The Pensions Act 2004 also introduces a new, much 
more active Pensions Regulator with powers to investigate and impose 
action. New codes of practice requiring compliance, and threatening a range 
of punishments from the freezing of assets to the removal of trustees have 
been introduced.  
Premiums: From 2006/2007 the Pension Protection levy is made up of a 
scheme-based element and a risk-based element. The principle for setting 
the premium is that it must be fair, proportional and transparent. The 
scheme-based levy will relate to the level of a pension fund’s unfunded 
liabilities and may consider the number of members, and the amount of 
pensionable earnings in respect of active members. The risk-based levy will 
take account of the level of the scheme underfunding and the likelihood of 
sponsoring employer insolvency. The PPF also considered taking a fund’s 
asset allocation into account, but decided against as this was seen as 
representing only around 3% of their outstanding risk. At least 80% of the 
estimated amount must be collected via the risk based element of the 
pension protection levies.  The risk based levy has been introduced over a 
transitional period to control costs – schemes will be required to provide a Pension Protection Fund valuation at the same time as their triennial 
valuation is undertaken. After the first year of the PPF’s existence, when an 
initial levy was set by the Secretary of State (to get the PPF up and running 
as quickly as possible), the Board of the PPF will have the power to alter the 
charge in order to regulate the total amount collected and therefore keep the 
PPF solvent, though within legislative limits (a 25% maximum annual 
increase and an overall levy ceiling). The PPF must consult with the 
government and appropriate stakeholders when it wishes to change the rate 
of the levies, and at least every 3 years if no changes are made. If the 
finances of the PPF are in trouble once the levy ceiling rate has been reached, 
the Act provides for the Board to borrow and to reduce indexation and 
revaluation to zero.  Once it has reduced revaluation and indexation to zero 
it can recommend that the Secretary of State to vary the 90% and 100% 
levels (if Secretary of State agrees this will then require further regulation). 
The government is keen to stress that it is at arm’s length to the fund.  It is 
self-financing, and the Act gives the Board significant freedom to determine 
the levy structure, within set parameters as contained within legislation. The 
government hopes this will prevent the PPF from becoming run for political 
objectives and experiencing the financial difficulties currently troubling the 
PBGC.
33 The PPF stress that  they are self-funding, and as only around 6% 
of assets are reclaimed during a bankruptcy proceedings (the PPF does not 
have priority creditor rights), the scheme has to rely on the levies it collects 
for its income (at least until such time as its assets become material, which is 
estimated to be around 2010). The relationship between the PPF and the new 
Pensions Regulator will be important, as the latter will act almost as a watch 
dog for the PPF, with powers to stop schemes becoming severely 
underfunded. The regulator will also take on some outsourced tasks for the 
PPF, including the collection of the levies. The Pensions Act also outlines 
new scheme specific funding requirements. A fraud compensation levy is 
also paid by both defined benefit and defined contribution schemes if and 
when the (separate) fraud compensation fund needs to pay out substantial 
sums after a case of fraud occurs.   
Investment: like the PBGC, the PPF will take on the assets and liabilities 
of insolvent schemes, rather than buying annuities. External fund managers 
have been appointed to invest the guarantee funds assets, with fixed income 
mandates initially designed to match liabilities. The strategic asset allocation 
of the funds will be reviewed at least annually, and will change according to 
adjustments in liabilities
34.  
ii. Issues:  Being a new scheme, the PPF have been keen to learn from the 
experiences of the other protection funds in operation internationally, particularly from 
the PBGC. Careful consideration of the risk based levy has therefore been made, and the 
PPF stress their arm’s length relationship with government. As mentioned, the role of  
 
the UK’s Pension Regulator is also important in protecting the PPF from moral hazard. 
However, issues and debate still surround the PPF. 
Figure 6 
PPF : Lessons from international experience
• A Pension Insurance fund needs as much financial freedom as 
possible.
• Flexible process for setting the levy 
• need for risk-related levy
• need ability to take a long term view
• Financial importance of a few large claims.
• Do not guarantee full scheme benefits.
• Ensure the members of pension schemes are not affected by 
delays in rescuing their scheme.
• Moral hazard must be addressed both in relation to the rules of 
the pension scheme and corporate operations.
• Operate like a pension scheme to enable annual claims to be 
smoothed over time and avoid large changes between years in 
the levies on employers.




Costs: one of the major concerns over the new UK pension compensation 
scheme is that it will increase costs for defined benefit schemes, thereby 
encouraging even more of these to shift to a defined contribution basis
35. The 
Association of British Insurers, the Association of Consulting Actuaries and the 
Pensions Management Institute have all expressed such concerns. The 
government, however, insists that companies will actually enjoy savings under 
the new pension regulations of around GBP130 million, rising to 210million 
when taxes are simplified, (e.g. from reduced administration costs, and from 
indexation requirements being relaxed). However a survey by the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) taken during 2003 found that 50% of 
pension fund respondents believed that the PPF would make it less attractive to 
run DB schemes. Meanwhile the Government is still claiming that the levy 
represents only a very small percentage of the flow of contributions into DB 
schemes, and that the scheme will greatly increases the value of DB pensions to 
firms, as they will be useful for recruiting and retaining the best staff. There is 
also the suggestion that, with the new European Pension Directive, defined 
benefit funds could locate in another European state which does not operate 
such a compensation scheme (such as Ireland) in order to avoid paying the 
levies – raising the possibility of ‘adverse selection’ with only the weaker funds 
which may need such insurance remaining
36. Asset liability mismatch: concerns have been raised that the new funding rules 
may actually encourage, rather than alleviate pension funds’ asset liability 
mismatching. The Pensions Act 2004 specifies that risk premiums for the PPF 
will consider, amongst other risk factors, the “risks associated with the nature of 
the scheme’s investments when compared with the nature of its liabilities.”
37 
However, this should not necessarily be taken to imply that funds will be 
directed to fixed income assets for immunization purposes, given government 
comments that: “Our proposals (regarding scheme specific funding 
requirements) will allow schemes greater flexibility to match their investment 
strategy to the profile of their members – for example, schemes with younger 
members may be freed to invest more heavily in assets expected to give a 
higher return over the long term.”
38 Even if fixed income holdings are to receive 
a lower premium, what mechanisms are in place to ensure that funds do not 
simply switch their asset allocation at the end of year to ensure lower charges 
and then to switch them into higher return assets for the rest of the period? As 
of 2007, the PPF decided not to include asset allocation issues in the risk-based 
premium as they are only estimated represent around 3% of the outstanding risk 
to the scheme. There are also concerns over how the PPF will invest its money. 
Despite warnings from the actuarial profession, the plan seems to be intending 
to invest premiums in the same way as its pension fund client, holding both 
equities and bonds (though initial investments are to be made only in fixed 
income assets). The asset allocation will be determined by the Board of the PPF, 
who are aware of these potential problems, and stress that their own allocation 
will be set according to the liabilities they take over (e.g. equity investments 
may be used to cover the liabilities of younger schemes
39). Currently the assets 
are invested 70% in fixed income and 30% in equities (which is lower than the 
average UK pension scheme’s equity exposure). 
 
 Lack of funding: though the PPF initially estimated it would raise around GBP 
300m a year, though this was raised to GBP 575m at the end of 2005 and set at 
GVP 675m for 2007/8.
40. The ceiling currently set by the government is GBP 
770m. Some observers remain concerned regarding the organisation’s funding 
over the long-term. Studies have shown that bankruptcies are ‘lumpy’ and 
therefore the protection scheme risks being overwhelmed at any one time, but 
particularly early on when built up premium reserves are low. Indeed if claims 
may be so skewed that it would be practically impossible to build up the 
multiyear reserves required, leaving the scheme almost inevitably exposed at 
some point in future (see McCarthy/ Neuberger model
41). Some actuarial 
studies estimate that the fund needs closer to GBP 600m a year to remain fully 
solvent, and could therefore be facing a deficit of GBP 3bn in 10 years time
42. 
The issue of a government guarantee should the fund get into financial 
difficulties has also been discussed. The government is ruling out the use of 
taxpayers’ money, but retains reserve powers to reduce the level of  
 
compensation if there are large claims (though this can only be operated 
following a request from the Board). Some argue that aggrieved pensioners will 
not believe that the PPF is not an arm of the government if the system were to 
get into trouble, whilst others believe the government should take an even more 
explicit role, possibly committing tax payers’ funds up front.
43   
 
The PPF itself uses a stochastic Long Term Risk Model to estimate the nature 
of the risks it is facing (a difficult task given the PPF is modelling over a 50-60 
year period and therefore multiple economic cycles, and is dealing with skewed 
distributions). The PPF has found that its exposure is concentrated, with the top 
40 pension plans making up 1/3 of the PPF’s potential liability. Given that none 
of these plans is in the high probability range, the short term exposure of the 
protection scheme appears limited (which is consistent with the PPF and 
international experience), but it is the potential catastrophic risk of these funds 
which drives the premium level. The UK Pensions Regulator therefore needs to 
focus on these top 40 plans to ensure they are well funded. The volatility of 
funding levels is also a major driver of premium levels, given this has swung 
from a 160bn GBP aggregate deficit as of January 2003 to a surplus 78bn GBP 
in May 2007. It is this inherent volatility in the system which the PPF is trying 
to cover. The PPF is exposed to extreme tail risk for a concentrated number of 
schemes. To cover the 99 percentile of risk, funds of 4billon GBP would be 
required, where as the GBP 770m set by government covers only up the 75
th 
percentile. This ‘tail risk’ again raises the philosophical questions of what these 
protection schemes are designed for - social protection, full insurance, 
catastrophic risk cover? How safe should the safety net be, and who decides, is 
an important question which drives the balance between the efficiency of these 






















































































Figure 8  
























Source: PPF  
 
Mispriced premiums: despite the PPF attempting to take more risk factors into 
account than any other existing guarantee fund when pricing premiums, concerns 
still remain that these will still not be set at proper market rates (though practically 
a balance has to be struck between setting market rates and keeping premiums 
affordable to avoid the further closure of DB schemes). Concerns have also been 
raised over the new funding rules. In a study conducted for Watson Wyatt, 
Anthony Neuberger (of London Business School) and David McCarthy (from 
Imperial College, London) concluded that a minimum funding standard is an 
inevitable component of a successful pension protection system. Replacing MFR 
with scheme-specific regime seems attractive and flexible, but the problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection remain
44. It is not yet clear how the new 
scheme specific funding rules will operate in relation to the PPF (though some 
suspect that these will simply migrate towards the PPF’s own required standards).  
There is also concern over how quickly the PPF will be able to adjust premiums in 
the face of a deteriorating position at a firm. The new Pensions Regulator should 
operate as an ‘early warning’ system, alerting the scheme to severely underfunded 
plans etc. Yet if premiums are only set once a year, severe damage could be done 
(via non contributions etc.) before actions are taken. 
 Anti- avoidance: rather than being swamped with initial claims from insolvent 
companies on its inauguration, initial controversy around the PPF has instead 
focused around a restructuring deal made with a firm still in operation - insurance 
broker Heath Lambert. The Pension Regulator, utilizing his clearance powers, 
approved a deal whereby the PPF guarantees the pensions of the firm in return for 
up to a 30% stake in the company. The Regulator insists that the company would 
have become insolvent without this deal, which therefore offers more upside to the 
PPF. However, concerns have been raised on several levels, including whether this 
will set a precedent, raising the moral hazard problem with other firms facing 
financial difficulties attempting to remove their pension liabilities to the PPF
45. As 
of mid 2007, 7,000 members of 10 schemes had transferred to the PPF. 
 
4. Germany   
i. Description 
History: the Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein Versicherungsverein auf 
Gegenseitigkeit (PSVaG
46) is an independent body by law, operating as a 
mutual insurance association, and designated by parliament as the sole 
carrier of mandatory pension termination insurance since its foundation 
in 1974. It was founded by the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände e.V., the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V., 
and the Verband der Lebensversicherungs-Unternehmen e.V. The PSVaG is subject to supervision from the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
(BaFin).  If it were to withdraw the PSVaG’s authorization, or its 
functioning become impossible for other reasons, the organization’s 
liabilities would be transferred to the KfW-Mittelstandsbank. Prior to the 
introduction of the protection system, pensions in Germany were treated 
as wage claims in bankruptcy, with the book reserve system 
consequently forcing workers to take on significant risk. The insolvency 
insurance system was conceived as a way of retaining necessary public 
support for book reserve funding. 
Coverage: book reserve, pension funds, support funds 
(Unterstützungskassen) and under certain circumstances direct insurance 
have statutory insolvency coverage from the PSVaG, which protects current 
and future beneficiaries in the event of employer insolvency. As of the end 
of 2005 59,636 companies were covered, comprising of around 8.7 million 
beneficiaries (3.8m retirees, 4.9m with vested entitlements), with a PV of 
insured benefits of €251bn, with around 440,000 individuals currently 
receiving €55.2m in monthly payments. The employers covered by the 
PSVaG hold around two-thirds of all German occupational pension plan 
liabilities. From 2002 some companies in Luxembourg have also been 
covered. The PSVaG does not insure retirement annuities purchased directly 
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  Operations: a key difference between the PBGC in the USA and 
the PSVaG in Germany is that on the insolvency of a member the latter 
purchases annuities from a consortium of life insurance companies (this was 
made up of 58 companies in 2005 – Allianz being the largest). The PSVaG 
does not take over the assets of the pension fund, and consequently operates 
more like an intermediary, buying out benefits through private insurance 
companies. Benefits are secured up to a limit of 3x a reference monthly 
salary (€7,245 in 2004), with some being excluded, such as increases 
granted in the two years before insolvency and non-vested benefits. German 
law also apparently gives the PSVaG the authority to withdraw insurance 
cover if benefit commitments are changed by troubled firms to exceed levels 
prevailing elsewhere. Insured benefits are paid in full even if the bankruptcy 
involves criminal behaviour or if a firm’s contribution payments are not up 
to date. With the exception of the some steel companies, most claims 
involve small firms. The system therefore involves extensive cross subsidy, 
but large companies seem to accept that this is a small price to pay for 
continued access to internal financing via the book reserve system.  
Premiums: the PSVaG is financed via contributions in the form of an 
annual insurance premium, taking a PAYG approach to financing. Each 
year’s premium is based on estimated losses during the previous 12 
months, with this estimate divided by the contribution basis (the insured 
pension liabilities) to give a contribution rate.  Premiums paid therefore 
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year
contribution assessment basetime, and this has led to volatility in contribution rates (highest on AEG 
bankruptcy in 1982 at 0.69% of plan liabilities, 0.49% 2005, 31 year average 
0.26%). Apart from the fact that the premium paid to the PSVaG in respect 
of pension funds is 80% lower than that for the book reserve or support 
funds (reflecting the fact that they are funded), no risk adjustment occurs to 
the premium charged. The number of insolvency claims in 2005 for the 
PSVaG amounted to 580, resulting in total claims of €574m. 




















































Investments: As of 2005, the PSVaG’s investments amounted to 
€962.6m, with 16% held in shares, 42% in fixed income and 42% in 
deposits.  
ii.  Issues   
A major reform of the PSVaG has been proposed, with a bill passing 
through the Germany parliament during 2006
48. The government plans to 
change financing of the PSVaG from the current PAYG system to a fully 
funded status. Reform is being driven by two factors. First, changes in 
German pension law in recent years have caused a shift away from book 
reserves and other pension scheme financing arrangements that require little 
or no PSVaG coverage (e.g. due to the recently simplified option of 
transferring pension obligations to pension funds) – which results in a 
thinning of the contribution base. ‘Old obligations’ will therefore have to be 
spread across a smaller number of contributing firms, causing contribution  
 
rates to rise. The reform is also being driven by increasing bankruptcies in 
recent years, which has also put upward pressure on contributions (e.g. total 
contributions amounted to €1.2bn in 2005, an increase of 36% from the 
€882m collected in 2004). The proposal is for a new fund to be created, into 
which employers will pay for a period of 15 years (the period over which 
most of the outstanding obligations mature) covering the cash value of the 
current payable and vested benefits – amounting to €2.5bn of entitlements or 
‘old obligations’. The PSVaG estimate that building up this funding will not 
have a large impact on premiums. A one off charge for covering old 
obligations will be levied according to 2005 contributions – which will 
result in a charge of around 0.9% of pension liabilities, payable over 15 
years, i.e. a 0.06% annual charge. Entitlements to future pension payments 
will be financed through contributions to be levied by the PSVaG in the year 
in which the employer becomes insolvent – as is currently the case with 
payable pension benefits. Future entitlements are estimated to require a 
contribution rate of 0.04-0.05% - giving total contribution of c0.10% - 
0.11% of liabilities. In order to prevent volatility, the PSVaG will be able to 
smooth premiums (any increase in charges may be smoothed over 4 years, 
provided that the liquidity of the PSVaG is not impacted). Other proposed 
change includes the interest rate which the PSVaG must use when assigning 
pension benefits to the consortium of life assurance companies
49. The 
PSVaG also plans to move to risk-based levies, provided they can obtain 
external ratings for all the companies they cover. Employers are said to 
support the proposed changes, hoping that investment returns generated on 
the accumulated funds in future (which should reach around €1tn) will allow 
for lower employer contributions. As of mid 2007, the PSVaG has collected 
payments more quickly than anticipated, with €690m of the €2.2bn collected, 
giving a capitalization ratio of around 30%. 
 
5. Sweden   
i. Description   
History: aside from schemes covering public sector workers, there are 
two main occupational pension schemes in Sweden. The first, known as the 
ITP, is for private-sector, white- collar workers. Funds which are run 
through the establishment of a pension foundation or book reserves (not 
those directly insured with insurance company Alecta) must insure the risk 
of insufficient assets in the case of insolvency with a protection fund 
managed by the Pension Guarantee Mutual Insurance Company (FPG). 
Founded in 1961, this is a mutual non-life insurance company which 
transacts insurance only for the safeguarding of pension rights.  Its board of directors consists of representatives of policyholders (i.e. around 1560 
sponsoring employers) and trade unions (one from each of Sif and Ledarna) 
and the organization is non-governmental. A third entity, the PRI (Pension 
Registration Institute), records the pension promises made by each employer, 
calculates the value of these obligations on a standard basis and serves as an 
intermediary that receives the employer contributions and eventually makes 
the payments to retirees. The second main occupational scheme is for blue-
collar workers. Previously known as the STP, insurance was provided by the 
AMFK when employers borrowed against their pension funds. From 1999 
the STP was replaced by the SAF-LO. This is safeguarded through member 
directed life insurance and the AMFK is now in run-off.  
Coverage:  Swedish pensions are provided on a contractual basis, with 
the majority of employees (90% of the workforce) being covered by 
collective agreements between unions and employer confederations. It is 
Sweden’s trade unions rather than the government which requires pension 
schemes to subscribe to the guarantee system. The FPG covers around 
200,000 employees in around 1500 firms. In the case of both the FPG and 
the AMFK only creditworthy companies are allowed to participate in the 
guarantee scheme, or those who are able to provide adequate collateral.  
Operations: in the case of a company insolvency, the FPG buys out 
benefits with the insurance company Alecta – meeting the full cost for 
securing the benefits in the case that liabilities were book reserved, and the 
shortfall in cases where liabilities were partially funded. Since inception the 
scheme has tried to assess the risk of a corporation to insolvency and to 
cover its exposure accordingly. It does so by effectively running an in house 
rating agency, analysing corporate accounts, historical performance, 
profitability, industry factors, leverage and where applicable external ratings. 
The insurers can respond in 4 ways to firms applying for coverage: 1. 
insurance is provided to financial strong companies; 2. insurance is offered 
to slightly riskier companies contingent on the assignment of capital; 3. 
insurance can be offered to subsidiaries with a security bond from the parent 
company; 4. insurance is offered only if the company provides a backup 
credit guarantee from a bank (which is tantamount to a rejection). Contracts 
can last up to 3 years and a key time for stepping in and demanding more 
collateral if the situation looks to be deteriorating is when the renewal is due. 
In the direst circumstances, the FPG can require the entire amount 
outstanding to be wound up over 5 years through the purchase of annuities 
from an insurance company. Demand for immediate termination arises in 
special situations such as when operations cease or a change in ownership 
takes place which could undermine the company. On average a far higher 
percentage of bankruptcy claims are recovered than by other protection 
programs (around 2/3rds vs. only 6% by the PPF and similar levels for the  
 
PBGC), largely due to the surety bonds provided by parent companies. 
Uniquely amongst guarantee schemes the full benefits are covered with no 
restrictions. FPG and AMFK reinsure their liabilities to protect themselves 
against extraordinarily high claims in any single year.  
Premiums: in the case of employers using the book reserve method, the 
yearly contribution (as of 2006) was 0.3% applied to total book reserved 
pension liabilities. Premiums for pension obligations funded via a 
foundation are reduced (to 0.1% in 2006) for the part which is covered by 
assets in the fund. The company pays the same premium to the FPG 
regardless of whether collateral has been pledged or not, or whatever its 
credit rating, except where the entire pension commitment is covered by a 
bank guarantee (when a lower premium applies), but this is unusual. 
Policyholders have an obligation to help the FPG to meet claims should 
reserves be totally exhausted. In this case additional charges may be made, 
capped at 2% of pension liability of a company. Members who have been 
policy holders for 10+ years qualify for a policy holder’s bonus if board of 
FPG decides to grant one and this is based on the sum of premiums paid 
during the last ten years. Claims were high in the early 1990’s (during the 
Swedish financial crisis), but have since been limited to around 10 per year. 
In 2005 premiums of SEK248m ($34m) were collected and a bonus of SEK 
147m ($20m) was granted. Insurance exposure amounted to SEK120bn 
($16.6bn), with 6 claims being made.  
Investments: as of 2005, assets of SEK15.2bn ($2.1bn), were invested 
67% in fixed income, 32% in equity. Strong returns on assets in recent years 
have allowed bonuses to be paid. 
Figure 12 
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The Swedish model is probably the most successful currently in 
existence. The issue is therefore whether it could be transferred to other 
countries wishing to introduce a pension benefit guarantee scheme. One of 
the major obstacles would be implementing such a rigorous screening 
procedure on a large scale, mainly due to cost. Could an external credit 
rating of some form therefore be used? As the major rating agencies have 
become somewhat discredited in recent years (e.g. failing to pick up on the 
Asian crisis or scandals at US companies such as Enron), another proxy, 
such as credit default spreads (CDFs) or other credit swap derivatives could 
be used (though research suggests that these are also not always accurate 
predictors of insolvency). The system may also be difficult to introduce as 
bankruptcy laws may have to be changed, and the collateral demands made 
could push up the cost of debt. The system is therefore interesting in theory, 
but would need an independent rating agency with significant powers to 
make it work.  The FPG stress that the purpose of the system is not to 
provide ‘soft credit’ to  companies via the pension system, but a way for 




i. Switzerland     
History: the Sicherheitsfonds
50 was established in 1986 by the federal 
government as an independent, public foundation.
51 The supreme body is the 
Foundation Board, on which the top-level organizations of the social 
partners, the public administration and a neutral member have seats. The 
guarantee fund insures pension obligations up to a maximum specified in the 
country’s Law of Old-age, Survivors and Disability Pension Plans (BVG / 
LPP 1985) and was designed to cover a considerable variety of plan designs 
(Swiss funds largely being DC in nature with guaranteed minimum returns). 
The guarantee fund supports all mandatory benefits promised by second tier, 
occupational plans, (including old age, survivor, disability benefits etc.). An 
interesting feature of the Swiss scheme is that protection is provided on the 
bankruptcy of the fund rather than the sponsoring firm (reflecting the strict 
legal separation of pension funds and their sponsoring corporations in 
Switzerland). In theory the guarantee fund could take on the responsibilities 
for a solvent company, but in practice this has not happened (as companies 
feel an unwritten moral obligation to make sure their funds are covered 
themselves).  
Coverage: employer and employee organizations must establish and 
manage a safety fund (sicherheitsfond) at the federal level. The scheme is 
mandatory for defined benefit and DC occupational schemes, including both 
those schemes providing government specified minimum benefits and those 
providing above the minimum. Around c3,800
52  funds, or 3.2m insured 
persons are covered. Even though some public funds have an underlying 
guarantee from the state, canton or city and therefore do not require further 
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Benefits paid out in CHF million based on type of benefit scheme
Overview LOB Guarantee Fund Switzerland
 
Source: LOB 
Operations: a pension fund is deemed insolvent in Switzerland if it 
cannot pay statutory or regulatory benefits which are due and if restructuring 
is no longer possible (i.e. if liquidation, bankruptcy or similar proceedings 
have been initiated against it). The guarantee scheme then attempts to secure 
pension benefits with suitable institutions (e.g. insurance companies), 
operating like the PSVaG in Germany by buying annuities, rather than 
taking on the assets of insolvent schemes. Benefits are maintained in their 
entirety, with an insured salary cap of 1.5x the Social Security Upper 
Earnings limit. Insurance is provided for fixed monetary amounts that are 
uniform across all plan types. As well as the usual main function (i.e. secure 
the payment of benefits if pension institutions are insolvent), the Swiss fund 
also has additional and unique roles, such as to pay subsidies to pension 
institutions with financial difficulties due to an unfavourable age structure, 
and payments to meet extraordinary costs of Auffangeinrichtung (collective 
scheme set up to administer vested benefits not transferred to a new 
employer and to provide a legal minimum benefits where an employer has 
not setup a plan). Furthermore the scheme may sue trustees or fund 
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Number of insolvency files settled (distribution by type of benefit scheme)
Overview LOB Guarantee Fund Switzerland
Source: 
LOB 
Premiums: the fund is financed through levies which are determined by 
the scheme’s board and approved by the Federal Social Insurance Office. In 
2005 contributions for insolvency insurance were 0.03 %, applied to the sum 
of all vested rights and 10x the sum of pensions in payment. Extra 
contributions (covering the subsidy for funds disadvantaged by an older 
work force) of 0.07 % on the basis of the payroll totals coordinated on a pro 
rata basis pursuant to BVG are required for registered funds providing 
benefits. These contribution rates will remain the same for 2006 . No direct 
link exists between the exposure of the guarantee fund and premiums 
charged.   2212 claims were made in 2005 (vs. a peak of 2821 in 2002), 
involving insolvency payments of CHF  46.7m. The situation for 
occupational benefit schemes  has improved and stabilised in the past three 
years. Subsidies paid to funds with an older work force increased somewhat 
to CHF 72m. Although the scheme does not take over the assets of insolvent 
pension funds, but buys out their obligations with annuities, excess 
contribution income has allowed the guarantee scheme to build up a reserve 
fund of CHF 192.3m. The LOB provides a good example of the importance 
of flexibility and adjusting operations to deal with developments over time. 
The scheme proved over cautious in the 1980’s, with premiums set to high. 
A balance was found in the early 1990s but later in the decade expenditure 
rose beyond expectations. The scheme has changed its premium mechanism 
again and is now back in surplus. However, LOB still does not feel that it 
has satisfactorily answered the question of how much capital a protection 
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Revenue / expoenditure in CHF million from 2000 (new contribution  system)
 
Source: LOB  
 
•  Investment: the scheme can invest assets with the same restrictions 
as apply to pension funds. As of  2005, 58.6  % of funds were 
invested in CHF bonds,  4.3  % in cash,  10.4  % in domestic 
equity, 16.8 % in foreign equity and 9.8 % in foreign bonds.  This 
is one potential source of moral hazard which is not found in the 
Swiss system, as the investment policy of Swiss pension funds has 
been very conservative. This is partly due to culture, and also as 
fixed and legally required interest must be paid on mandatory 
pension credits combined with the contribution levels. There is also 
no doubt who owns the pension surplus in Switzerland – the 
workers – and consequently there is little incentive for plan 
sponsors to follow high risk, high return strategies (though this may 
change as returns are viewed and compared more in an 
international context).  
 
ii.  Japan    
•  History: although defined contribution schemes are now allowed in 
Japan, many occupational schemes remain defined benefit in nature, 
including traditional lump sum severance pay plans funded by book 
reserves. Many Employee Pension Funds (EPFs) were established 
in the 1960s and 1980s. These are  pension plans with over 500 
members for single-employer schemes or over 3000 for multi-
employer schemes (for EPFs newly introduced after April 2005, 
over 1000 members are required for single-employer schemes and 
over 5000 members for multi-employers schemes). As well as 
providing private pension benefits, EPFs also manage a portion of 
the public pension scheme - the Employee Pension Insurance or 
EPI, which is the employment related social security pension for 
private sector employees. This public pension portion of the EPF is 
known as the ‘Substitution Component’. The Pension Guarantee 
Program was set up in 1989 by the Pension Fund Association 
(PFA) to provide termination insurance for EPF plans (other 
occupational pensions, know as Tax Qualified Pension Plans or 
TQPPs are not covered as they do not have any funding rules and 
are not covered by the PFA annuity programme).  The Employees 
Pension Insurance Act (EPIA) states that the PFA is able to carry 
out the Pension Benefit Guarantee Program with the approval of the 
Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare. The EPIA does not 
describe the Program in detail – implying that it should be designed 
and operated appropriately based on the consensus of member 
EPFs. The essential characteristics of the Program are that it is a mutual aid system of EPFs, which aims at securing Minimum 
Preserved Benefits, within certain limits, in the case of ‘inevitable’ 
dissolution, due to bankruptcy or business deterioration of 
sponsoring companies. It is based on the understanding that every 
EPF makes its best efforts to secure rights of its own plan 
participants. Before setting up the fund in 1989, suggestions were 
sought by the PFA from the PBGC in the US. The following three 
suggestions were given: to make the program as simple as possible; 
not to extend the guarantee range beyond financial capabilities; to 
make efforts to prevent the dissolution of underfunded plans. These 
pieces of advice determined the basic structure of the Program 
which was then implemented.  
•  Coverage: all EPF funds (around 1/3 of all DB plans in Japan) must 
make contributions to this scheme. Around 5 million workers are 
covered. The PFA Articles state that all member EPFs should 
participate in the Program (in 1989 the MHLW gave approval of 
the implementation of the Program on the condition that the PFA 
Article made participation obligatory, and in 2001 the PFA General 
Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution reconfirming the 
obligatory requirement). There has been discussion of the 
introduction of a Statutory Pension Benefit Guarantee Scheme to 
cover all DB plans (and possibly also DC schemes in cases of 
fraud). Indeed the Welfare Committee of both Houses of the Diet 
adopted resolutions requiring the government to give further 
consideration to the issue of the introduction of such scheme when 
the Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Bill was passed in June, 
2001. However such a move is strongly resisted by employers (who 
are unwilling to give support to other companies for the sake of 
preserving severance allowances and who consider that defined 
benefit plans are derived from severance allowances). With such 
situation in mind, the next statutory revision of the pension system 
is expected in 2006 or 2007.  Yet pressure for the introduction of 
such a fund may grow as the social security pension is scaled down 
and sooner or later corporate pensions have to assume a greater role 
in the retirement income.  
•  Operations:  if an EPF is wound up, the PFA takes over the 
Substitution Component in exchange for collecting the amount 
equal to the minimum funding required for this component (known 
as the ‘Minimum Technical Provision of the Substitution Portion’ 
or MTPSP). Any remaining assets are distributed to all plan 
participants, who can chose to take the portion of these residual 
assets due to them either as a lump sum or an annuity (which is  
 
paid by and known as the PFA Annuity). The guarantee scheme 
covers only those participants who choose the annuity option. The 
maximum guaranteed benefit is 0.3x the Substitution Component 
and half of the benefits exceeding this amount. The present value of 
the maximum guaranteed benefit is called as the Ceiling Amount
53. 
In principle the benefits which the program pays out should be 
equal to the unfunded liability (i.e. the sum total of the Ceiling 
Amounts of all participants minus the amount of residual assets). 
However, a ceiling of Y7bn (cUS$70m) is imposed on the amount 
of the unfunded liability
54, which was introduced in 2000 to keep 
the Program solvent with affordable amounts of contribution.  
 
Figure 19: Ceiling of the Applicable range of Guarantee for Individual Participants    
(i.e. Ceiling Amount)
55 
   
 
 
Insurable events cannot be described shortly in fine detail, because they 
include various fund dissolutions due to financial difficulties of sponsoring 
companies. However, with the accumulation of precedence, the criteria of 
invoking the guarantee have been clarified gradually. The basic principle of 
invoking the guarantee is that the fund dissolution was caused by 
bankruptcy or similar financial difficulties of sponsoring companies. 
Insurable events include ‘inevitable’ dissolutions due to: bankruptcy of 
sponsor companies; business deterioration of sponsoring companies or 
industries as a whole to which the sponsoring company belongs; or other 
circumstances under which the sponsoring companies are considered having been unable to sustain the EPF. There are criteria for applying the latter two 
conditions for the case of single-employer EPFs including: the sponsoring 
company having had a balance sheet in the red consecutively for several 
years before dissolution and the balance sheet having been in a situation 
where debts exceeded assets or cumulative deficits, excluding the retirement 
benefits provisions; also that the number of active participants at the EPF 
had been decreasing substantially, the plan is very mature and contribution 
rates were considerably high in comparison with those of other EPFs with 
similar levels of benefits, and further contribution hikes were considered to 
be unavoidable. In addition to these insurable events, benefits covered can 
be reduced based on the funded status of the EPF. If the funded ratio is 
below 50% a reduction formula is imposed.  Program benefits may also be 
reduced due to inappropriate management of the EPF when: directors of the 
EPF are considered to have neglected their duties (reduction of the Program 
Benefits by up to 20% of the Unfunded Liability); when the administration 
or operation of the EPF are considered having been inappropriate (reduction 
of the Program Benefits by up to 20% of the Unfunded Liability); when 
appropriate measures have not been taken to secure assets after resolution to 
dissolve the EPF was adopted, and substantial amounts of assets were 
consequently lost (reduction of the Program Benefits by up to 30% of the 
Unfunded Liability). In terms of governance, the Program is operated under 
the control of the Steering Committee, which is composed of 2 
representatives of the Pension Fund Association and 12 member EPFs.  The 
PFA operates the Program in compliance with the recommendations of this 
committee, including whether to invoke the guarantee (the Program 
Benefits) to individual cases, whether to reduce the Program Benefits and to 
what extent. The committee also investigates key issues such as benefit 
structure, ceiling on guarantees, contributions of member EPFs to the 
Program etc. In other words the Program is self-governed by EPFs and is not 
directed by the government. The decisions of the Steering Committee are 
completely disclosed to all EPFs.  As experience is gained, fewer claims 
with a scare chance of being approved by the Steering Committee are being 
received.   
 




The government also allows another de facto type of protection for the 
Substitution Component via a system known as ‘daiko henjo’. Since 
April 2002, EPF schemes have been allowed to hand back this Substitution 
Portion to the government (the EPI)
56, a measure recognized as part of the 
de-regulation of the operation of corporate defined benefit pension plans. 
This move was partly due to the stagnation of Japanese financial markets 
and poor investment return for over a decade, but also due to changes in the 
Japanese accounting standard on retirement benefits introduced in 2000, 
which requires that companies evaluate the liability of the Substitution 
Portion in the same way as the rest of the occupation pension scheme (i.e. 
the purely private part of retirement benefits), irrelevant of the legal liability 
of the Substitution Portion - the MTPSP
57. Any EPF scheme which carries 
out a daiko henjo operation will be converted to a ‘New Defined Benefit 
Pension Plan’ (as of September 2004 a total of 784 new DB funds had been 
set up, 546 via daikyo henjo operations).  
•  Premiums: premiums are determined by three components: per capita 
premiums according to the number of participants; premiums in 
proportion to the total benefit amount guaranteed; and premiums in 
proportion to the amount of unfunded liabilities (the sum total of the 
Ceiling Amounts of all participants plus the MTPSP minus the amount 
of assets). The maximum of the sum of first two components is set at 
Y8.82m. The maximum of the third component is set at Y0.861m. The 
ceiling placed on premiums means that larger companies pay lower 
guarantee premiums. The premium ceiling was really imposed to persuade larger companies to accept the introduction of the guarantee 
fund.  Currently, premiums are further reduced by 35% from the sum of 
these components, as the Program currently holds funds in excess of its 
targeted contingency reserve (i.e. by which the solvency of the Program 
is expected to be kept for 5 years without further contribution, with 
90% probability). The excess amount is Y8.05 billion, and by assuming 
that the excess amount is withdrawn during 20 years, it is possible to 
reduce the total premiums by Y450 million, which corresponds to 35% 
of the total contribution.  
Table 1: Contributions to the Program (applied from 2005) 
Contribution 
proportionate 



















+ 0.0083%  +  0.0123% 








•  Investment: reserves at the Pension Guarantee Fund have been 
increasing since 1998, with the amount invested by the PFA now at 
Y30bn. The financing of the institution has remained on an even keel, 
partly as, despite the continued underfunding of occupational pension 
schemes in Japan
58, rising bankruptcy levels, and therefore rising 
claims against the Pension Guarantee Fund, the criteria for invoking the 
guarantee only include fund dissolution due to bankruptcy or similar 
financial difficulties of sponsoring companies, the criteria have been 
strictly applied, and the automatic benefit reduction formula based on 
the funded status of dissolved funds is also incorporated. Since the 
Program started its operation in 1989, there have been 40 claims (as of 
mid 2007), with 24 cases being accepted (with reductions between 10-
90%).  However, it should be noted that there have been far more funds 
wound-up during the same period, many underfunded in comparison to 
the MFSA, which means that the rights of participants have not been 
properly protected by the funding rules alone.   
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1.  As expressed by Pesando (1996): “Compensating wage differentials will, in a competitive labour 
market, internalize risks associated with underfunded pension promises.” See also Lindeman 
(2004). 
2. See  www.pensionstheft.org, the website of a pressure group claiming compensation for lost 
occupational pensions on the bankruptcy of their plan sponsors. Members claim they were never 
made aware of this risk to their pension, and that they were led to believe that their pension was 
‘guaranteed’, quoting publications from the Financial Services Authority and the Department of 
Work and Pensions. They also argue that the government should bear responsibility as they were 
incentivized to join their corporate pension scheme. 
3.  Most of these studies focus on the PBGC of the United States. It is well known from financial 
literature that the guarantee provided by the PBGC is analogous to a put option. The value of this 
put, and therefore the correct level of premiums, can be derived from options pricing theory. Hsieh, 
Chen and Ferris (1994), for example, found that the PBGC approximately correctly charges over-
funded pension plans but significantly under-charges underfunded ones. Summary of studies of the 
PBGC premium levels in McCarthy (2003).  
4.  See David McCarthy and Anthony Neuberger’s claims model in: “Will the PPF go the way of the 
US fund?”,  Pensions Management, April, 2004, available on http://www.pensions-
management.co.uk 
5.  It is interesting that one of the few defined benefit schemes to be set up in recent years in the US 
was by a charity (the United Methodist Church) and therefore outside the PBGC’s jurisdiction. See 
Financial Times 3 September 2004: ‘Benefits or bailouts? Fund deficits may topple US pension 
policy into crisis.’ 
6.  Ippolito (2004) puts forward the radical suggestion that private insurance should be compulsory, 
with market pricing taking into account funding levels and investment policy restrictions, doing 
away with need for complex funding rules and encouraging asset matching and full funding. See 
also Lindeman (2004).   
7.  For example, Michael Gordon, one of the key architects of ERISA, has written that the actuarial 
soundness of the PBGC was deliberately sacrificed at its inception point in order to gain political 
support for the passage of ERISA- “The supposition that Congress was prepared to accept loss of 
jobs and further industrial decline in return for sound insurance principles is preposterous and is 
why, even today, there will be stiff resistance to redesigning pension insurance...” From dissenting 
comments on Ippolito’s ‘The Economics of Pension Insurance’ (1989). Quoted in Ippolito (2004).  
8.  Pension Academic Zvi Bodie for one has argued that if politicians wish to subsidize weak firms 
they should do so directly, not through changing accounting rules and through the pension back 
door, see The Economist, 13th February 2003, ‘ Discount them at your peril.’ 
9. 
Dutch funding rules require pensions to be fully funded at all times. On the liabilities side this includes the   immediate coverage of all salary 
increases, pension indexing or retroactive plan improvements, and on the asset side the immediate correction of negative investment returns. Various 
reserves must be held by funds,   including a general risk reserve of 5%, an investment reserve (sufficient to address such events as an immediate 
25% in share values – 30% for emerging markets – a 15% decline in real estate values and including equivalent buffers for interest rate and inflation 
risk, foreign exchange risk etc.) a future pension adjustment reserve, and any additional reserves demanded by the regulator (PVK). As a result, required 
funding   levels are generally around 120-135% of accrued liabilities. If the 105% funding requirement cannot be met the PVK must be 
informed immediately, a plan for returning to full funding developed within 3 months, and action taken within 12 months.  
10.  The problem of systematic underfunding arises from the issues of ‘tax arbitrage’ and the 
‘insurance effect’. The former states that financially secure firms have an incentive to make their 
pension contributions as large as possible in order to gain the maximum tax advantage. Meanwhile, 
companies in financial trouble, paying no tax, have the opposite incentive, to reduce pension 
contributions, underfund their pensions, and follow a risky asset allocation policy. These 
tendencies are made even worse by providing insurance for pension benefits – i.e. the insurance 
effect. Funding requirements should therefore be carefully coordinated with any guarantee scheme 51 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to ensure that companies maintain funding levels, even when in financial difficulty. See Smalhout 
(1996). 
11.  Though in the case of funding rules care needs to be taken not to make defined benefit pensions 
prohibitively expensive to run, and with priority bankruptcy rights the implications for credit 
availability and the broader economy must be considered.  
12.  The following is based on arguments taken from OECD publication: ‘Insurance and Private 
Pensions Compendium for Emerging Economies: Book 1 Part 1: 2) b Policyholder Protection 
Funds: Rationale and Structure’, author Takahiro Yasui 2001. 
13.  European Commission Working Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes: MARKT/2525/03. Arguments in favour of insurance guarantee schemes, and 
ones refuting arguments against, which could also apply to pensions include:  
•  flexible and faster at providing compensation than wind up process and guarantee a minimum  
•  consumer confidence has been hit by the crisis within the insurance industry and will be even more 
destroyed if claims are not met in the case of a winding-up 
•  as social security shifts towards private products reliable protection and  safety nets are needed  
•  political pressure to introduce schemes rise following corporate wind-ups without full compensation  
•  Member States which have already set up insurance guarantee schemes seem to have positive 
experience in this regard – same with banking and securities sector 
•  Moral hazard: no evidence has been presented that this exists, providing coverage is limited   
•  Other safety measures: (technical provisions/ special treatment in wind up hierarchy/ effective 
supervision etc.) might not be sufficient if the event of a winding-up due to a lack of assets 
•  Costs: no increase in premiums observed in those Member States which already have insurance 
guarantees. 
14.  OECD Guidelines on Funding and Benefit Security in Occupational Pension Plans. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/22/38547978.pdf 
15.  The Central Pension Security Institute (CSPI) provided specialized credit insurance to Finnish 
employers who obtained loans from their pension funds. Losses began to accumulate in 1989 as 
the Russian communist economy collapsed, causing many Finnish firms (de facto part of the 
Russian state model) to lose their guaranteed order flow. The CSPI’s eventual collapse in 1993 
was due to operational and well as systematic factors, including political influence (e.g. the 
Finnish Parliament set the rate which companies could borrow against their pension funds), weak 
credit analysis and a lack of intervention powers. The Finnish experience shows that pension 
insurance used to promote other goals (supporting industries etc.) can lead to a misallocation of 
resources, and that an inherently unstable system can survive for years before suddenly collapsing 
due to unanticipated losses. For details see Smalhout (1996): p214-223. It should be noted, 
however, that the collapse of the Finnish system did not cause any losses for members and 
beneficiaries, as the guarantee insurance was only a part of the guarantee scheme in statutory 
private pension scheme in Finland. The main guarantee scheme is the joint-liability of financing 
the pension benefits. This means in practice that if a pension institution became insolvent, the 
insurance portfolio would be transferred to another pension institution and the potential.deficit in 
funding would be covered by the contribution. 
16. See  also ‘Insuring the Uninsurable?’ published in Morgan Stanley’s March 2004 Global Pensions 
Quarterly, authors Nigel Cresswell and Aurelie Rabou. Extract available in Investment & Pensions 
Europe July/August edition, also available online at www.ipe.com 
17.  Current numbers and annual report available on www.pbgc.gov 
18.  http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/retirementsecurityfactsheet.htm 
19.  The PBGC also uses a complex model to estimate future claims, incorporating stochastic 
movement in stocks, interest rates, employment levels, bankruptcies and other factors .The 
PBGC’s 2003 Annual Report shows the possible projected outcomes in 2013. The expected net 
position (i.e. the average of all possible positions in 10 years time) is a deficit of $18.7bn – yet the  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
position reported for 2004 is already worse than this projected average. The model estimates a 1 in 
5 chance that the organization will enjoy favourable enough conditions to return to surplus, but 
also 10% chance that the deficit will be $49bn, a 5% chance that it will be $60.3bn and a 1% 
chance that it will reach $82.5bn (see Ippolito 2004). 
20.  Financial Times 18th November, 2004: ‘Pension safety net’s $78bn hole’: the amount required has 
been estimated at $78bn, $100bn if all potential claims from the airlines are included.  
21.  Financial Times 31st August, 2004: ‘Retirement worries move up US agenda’: the article reports 
that the US Treasury is said to have created a task force to examine how to save the PBGC in the 
event of a default by United Airlines, with the White House is considering legislative solutions. 
Bradley Belt, then executive director of the PBGC is quoted as saying: “This is not an immediate 
liquidity crisis, but unless something is done now, that hole will get bigger and bigger and raise the 
inevitability of a taxpayer bailout of significant magnitude.” Meanwhile Elaine Chao, Secretary of 
Labor, has been quoted as saying: “While the PBGC is not in crisis…it is clear that the financial 
integrity of the federal pension insurance scheme is at risk.” 
22.  In September 2005 Delta and Northwest airlines filed for bankruptcy protection, leaving the PBGC 
to face potential pension insurance claims of $8.4bn and $2.8bn respectively. This follows the 
settlement reached between the PBGC and United Airlines in April 2005 which saw the guarantee 
scheme taking on a $6.6bn claim from the airline’s 4 pension plans, as well as a $2.3bn claim from 
US Airways in February of the same year. For background details on United’s claim see: 
Financial Times 28th July, 2004: ‘Financial safety nets under threat’,  20th December 2004: 
‘United stirs up a hornets’ nest on pensions.’ 
23.  This ALM problem has led to comparisons between the PGBC and the FSLIC, the insurer of the 
Savings and Loan Institutes which collapsed, at huge expense to US tax payers, during the 1980s. 
These institutions got into trouble when interest rate levels and volatility rose in the 1970’s, 
exposing their asset liability mismatch between short term, variable deposits and fixed, long-term 
mortgage liabilities. They received a fatal, double hit with the collapse of the real estate market in 
the 1980s. Due to fierce lobbying and delayed action by politicians, hundreds of weak S+Ls were 
allowed to stay open, capital requirements were reduced and they were encouraged to expand into 
new risky deals. The cost of $150-200bn which it took to eventually solve the problem would have 
been much smaller if it had dealt with sooner. Commentators have warned that the political 
climate surrounding the current PBGC’s situation is alarmingly parallel to the S+L fiasco, though 
it should be noted that the obligations of the PBGC are due to be paid over a far longer time 
horizon than the S+Ls, so that insolvency is not a pressing issue. See John Ralfe, writing in ‘The 
Times Online’4/12/04 ‘Britain must learn from US pension pain’. Financial Times 13th September, 
2004: ‘A slow motion re-run of the S&L disaster: Stand by for a pension bail-out.’ 
24.  The $9 charge for every $1000 of underfunding is measured on a current liability, rather than a 
termination basis. This charge for underfunding can be avoided if a company shows it is generally 
90%+ funded on this current liability basis. Hence US Airways made no risk adjusted 
contributions for underfunding in the 4 years prior to its pension plan being taken over by the 
PBGC. The funding level was estimated to be 104% in 2000 on the current liability basis but only 
50% using termination calculations 2 years later. Similarly Bethlehem Steel, (which made no 
payment for the 3 years prior to termination), was 45% funded when taken as a claim in 2003, vs. 
the previous estimate used in the calculation for contributions of 84%.  
25.  Steven Kandarian’s comments taken from his testimony before the Governmental Affairs 
Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the budget, and international security of the 
United States Senate, September 15 2003 and from his evidence given before the Senate’s Special 
Committee on Aging, October 14 2003. 
26.  Indeed the PBGC itself has warned that the rules to accelerate funding relief which Congress has 
waived will cause its shortfall to grow by $4bn over the next 4 years.   
27.  Smalhout (1996) discusses the example of TWA and the influence of the company’s owner, Carl 
Icahn. 53 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
28.  PBGC’s strategic plan (available via www.pbgc.gov) states that average premium paid to the 
PBGC per participant is $23. This compares with average homeowner insurance of $487, auto 
insurance $786 or, Federal + State unemployment insurance $250. Though the PBGC claims this 
demonstrates their cost effectiveness, the premium level does seem too low given the 
organization’s current deficit position.  
29. See  www.fsco.gov.on.ca  http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/english/pensions/pbgf-20050331.pdf  
  The accounts for 2006/2007 have yet to be published, however the 2006 public accounts for 
Ontario show the PBGF assets as CAD143m, with liabilities of CAD417million, giving an 
underfunding level of CAD274m. See http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/english/budget/ 
30.  Some problems ironically arose out of the 1985 Pension Act which introduced additional 
protection for pensioners. Priority bankruptcy rights were given not only to existing pensions, but 
also to pension increases. Consequently, although retirees were largely protected when companies 
such as ASW went bankrupt in recent years an employee, due to retire in 1 week, lost up to 80-
90% of his or her promised pension. This has been changed in the 2004 Pension Bill, with 
pensions promised to active members ranking above future pension increases for current retirees.  
31.  Economist September 26th 2002 ‘How safe is your pension?’: when steel company ASW went 
bankrupt in July 2002 its pension fund, though compliant with UK minimum funding regulations, 
was only sufficient to pay around two thirds of pensioners’ accrued benefits.  
32.  I.e. 90% of the pension an individual had accrued at the start of PPF involvement with the scheme, 
revalued in line with the RPI (maximum 5%) between that date and the date the compensation 
comes into payment in line. 
33. See  DAFFE/CMF(2004)12:  “Developments related to corporate pension fund liabilities and 
funding gaps.’ Comments taken from UK government response. 
34.  For details of the asset allocation strategic and governance of the PPF see: ‘Statement of 




35.  Investment & Pensions in Europe 1 August 2003,  ‘Piling on the agony’, available on   
www.ipe.com 
36.  Financial Times, June 13 2005, ‘Great British Pensions Evacuation’  
37 .  Pensions Bill (Bill 57) Par 137 (3) (b) 
38.  See Department of Work and Pensions  paper June 2003:’Action on Occupational Pensions’ 
39.  Investment & Pensions in Europe 3 March  2005,  ‘UK protection fund aims to set risk levy 
quickly’, and 23 June 2005, ‘UK’s PPF names asset managers, custodian’, available on   
www.ipe.com 
40.  It should be noted that after its first months of operation only 3 initial applications were made to 
the PPF, from MG Rover, Bristol Community Sport Ltd and Pearce Signs Group – See: ‘PPF, in 
good shape’, 1 June 2005,  available on www.ipe.com 
41.  Description of David McCarthy and Anthony Neuberger’s claims model in: “Will the PPF go the 
way of the US fund?”, Pensions Management, April, 2004, available on http://www.pensions-
management.co.uk 
42.  Economist 15th April 2004 “Pensions: On the Cheap’. In addition, John Ralfe, an independent 
pension consultant and formerly Head of Corporate Finance at the Boots company, has estimated 
that, taking into account credit risk, underfunding and asset allocation, the FTSE100 companies 
alone should be charged a PPF fee of £600m. See RBC Capital Market, Open Forum Notes Vol. 6, 
available on www.JohnRalfe.com Standard and Poor’s simulations see the annual claim on the  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
PPF at GBP 1.5bn, in their worst case scenario – see Investment & Pensions in Europe 18 April  
2005,  ‘S&P see up to €2bn annual claim on UK’s PPF’, available on  www.ipe.com 
43.  Financial Times 21/7/2004 ‘Companies UK: A bad idea’ Martin Dickson. Idea put forward in the 
FT by Sir Tim Chessels, chairman of trustees at BT’s pension fund (which NB is in deficit and still 
has a high equity weighting), that the government should put tax payers’ money into the PPF.  
44.  Accountancy Age 17 December 2003: ‘Pension safety net worries financial directors’ available on 
www.accountancyage.com : article reports that a survey by the UK insurance group Prudential of 
financial directors found that 42% had reservations about new PPF, mostly on the basis that strong 
companies will end up bailing out weaker ones.   
45.  Financial Times coverage of the case includes, ‘Pensions watchdog primed to protect benefits not 
jobs’, 8 July 2005 
46.  Numbers quoted from the English summary of PSVaG annual report 2005. 2004 summary 




47.  The insurance industry recently launched a voluntary projected €500m insolvency protection fund 
which ‘de-regulated’ Pensionskassen (which serve a range of companies and account for around 
one-fifth of occupational pension assets) may join. Investment & Pensions in Europe, 24 May 
2006, ‘Pensionskassen get insolvency protection’ – available of www.ipe.com 
48.  Investment & Pensions in Europe 2 May 2006 ‘Germany plans huge pension insolvency fund’ – 
available on www.ipe.com 
49.  The current legal obligation of 2.75% being applied for payable pension benefits with a less 
conservative 3.67% applying to entitlements (including ‘old obligations’). 
50.  Also known as the LOB (Law on Ocuupational Benefits) Guarantee Fund. See: www.sfbvg.ch/en/bvg/bvg_home.htm 
51.  It is unclear if there is implicit government support behind the scheme and if public funds would 
be used to support the organization if it were in difficulty. Certainly increased premiums, reserves 
and even bank loans may be used to cover heavy losses before this were the case.  
52.  This number includes the 2600 registered pension funds and 1200 non-registered pension funds. 
Registered pension funds are authorized to provide the mandatory part of the second pillar. Note 
that pension funds often also insure (voluntarily) additional parts of workers salaries. 
53.  The discount rate for calculating the present value is fixed at 3.5% at present, therefore is greater 
than the discount rate for calculating the ‘Minimum Funding Standard Amount’ or MFSA of the 
pure private benefits. 
54.  This corresponds to the ceiling on the contribution to the Program (annually 65% of Y9.681m per 
fund). 
55.  Following charts taken from Nobuhiro Shimizu’s presentation on ‘Protection of Participants and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Program of Japan’, 
made at the OECD/ IOPS Conference on Private Pensions in Asia, Bangkok, Thailand, 27-28 April 2005 
 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/39/34723067.pdf 
56.  Goldman Sachs ‘Portfolio Strategy’, October 2002,  author Japan strategist Kathy Matsui  
57.  The MTPSP is evaluated, in actuarial terminology, by the retrospective method - i.e. the MTPSP is 
the termination value of cash inflows and outflows (premiums corresponding to the Substitution 
Portion and benefits paid out) with actual interest rates performed by the investment of social 
security fund (EPI). In other words, EPFs do not have any responsibility of paying additional 
contributions as long as the investment return is not less than that of the EPI. 
58.  In the fiscal year ending March 2004, assets at 283 of Japan's biggest corporate pension funds 
covered 77 per cent of their payment obligations, up from 62 per cent the previous year, according 55 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to Greenwich Associates, the US consultancy. See Financial Times, 26 July 2004, “Mood of crisis 
lifts in Japanese pension funds”.  A survey of all listed companies (3,414) by Nomura Securities 
found a lower funding ratio of 56% as of March 2004,‘Corporate Pension Obligations’ Nomura 
Daily Report, 7th September, 2004.  
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